Louisiana Tech University

Louisiana Tech Digital Commons
Doctoral Dissertations

Graduate School

Summer 2012

Effects of gender composition of target and sender
dyads on the tendency to infer lies
Byron J. Simoneaux
Louisiana Tech University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.latech.edu/dissertations
Part of the Behavioral Disciplines and Activities Commons, Counseling Psychology Commons,
and the Personality and Social Contexts Commons
Recommended Citation
Simoneaux, Byron J., "" (2012). Dissertation. 342.
https://digitalcommons.latech.edu/dissertations/342

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Louisiana Tech Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Louisiana Tech Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
digitalcommons@latech.edu.

EFFECTS OF GENDER COMPOSITION OF
TARGET AND SENDER DYADS ON
THE TENDENCY TO
INFER LIES

By
Byron J. Simoneaux, B.S., M.A.

A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy

COLLEGE OF EDUCATION
LOUISIANA TECH UNIVERSITY

August 2012

UMI Number: 3533097

All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.

UMI 3533097
Published by ProQuest LLC 2012. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

ProQuest LLC
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346

LOUISIANA TECH UNIVERSITY
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL

06/07/2012
Date

We
by

hereby

recommend

that

the

dissertation

prepared

under

our

supervision

Byron J. Simoneaux

entitled

EFFECTS OF GENDER COMPOSITION OF TARGET AND SENDER DYADS
ON THE TENDENCY TO INFER LIES

be

accepted

in

partial

fulfillment

of

the

requirements

for

the

Degree

of

Doctor of Philosophy

Supervisor tlH)/Jseraiti/>n Research
l lead of Department

Psychology and Behavioral Sciences
Department

Recommendation concurred in:

Kj oX^Ca
s_/f

^ yV 5

fl-J)
Advisory Committee

App

Director of Graduate Studies

Approved;

Dean ol the Graduate School

Dean of the College
(iS I'orm 13a
(6/07)

ABSTRACT
Lying is so common in human behavior that some have labeled it a social skill.
Despite the ubiquity of lies, humans have consistently been found to be poor lie detectors.
Attempts have been made to improve the accuracy of human lie detection. Unfortunately,
the most successful training only improves accuracy slightly above the level of chance.
Because of its importance to society, considerable effort has been aimed at developing
methods to help determine when people are lying. Researching how and why humans
infer that another person is lying has the potential to advance the understanding of lie
detection. Researchers have found that gender influences subjective judgments of
trustworthiness and credibility. Further, gender may also influence behaviors resulting
from these judgments. In other words, gender is likely to influence the tendency to infer
lies. The goal of this study was to determine if differences exist in the likelihood of
inferences that lies are being told due to the sex of the sender of the lies, the target of the
lies, and a third-person evaluator of the lies. It was hypothesized that targets (individuals
receiving a message) and third person evaluators would infer lies more often when the
potential liar was of the opposite sex of the target than when the potential liar was the
same sex as the target. Male participants would infer lies more often than female
participants in all conditions except when non-verbal cues are unavailable. A scale of
femininity would be negatively related to the number of lie inferences. Finally, it was
thought that lies would be inferred less often when liars are female than when they are
male. The results did not confirm any of the hypotheses. One surprising finding was that,
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as targets, participants inferred more lies when liars were female. Though the hypotheses
were not confirmed, the results are nonetheless important for future research into factors
affecting the inference of lies. Such factors have the potential to improve therapy
services, marketing, and various aspects of interactions with the legal system.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION
Paul Ekman (2001) defines lying as "when one person intends to mislead another,
doing so deliberately, without prior notification of the purpose, and without having been
explicitly asked to do so by the target" (p. 28). Ekman goes on to identify several
potential motives for lies, the most frequent of which is to avoid punishment. A
non-exhaustive list of other motives to lie includes the protection of the self or others, to
gain a reward, to win admiration, to avoid embarrassment, and to exercise power
(Ekman, 2001).
Lying is so common as a social behavior that it has been called it a "skill"
(DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996). Like other social skills, children
begin learning how to deceive early in their lives and hone their abilities through practice
and social learning (Polak & Harris, 1999). In fact, Mitchell and Anderson (1997) believe
that deceptive behaviors predate the human race. Investigators have observed simple
deceptions among the behaviors of non-human primates.
Lying benefits liars, but carries a high cost to society. So great is this cost that
many techniques for lie detection have been developed in an effort to combat deception's
negative impact. "Lie detectors" offer a range in accuracy and complexity. Polygraphs,
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among the most well-known lie detection techniques, measure physiological arousal in
order to detect lies. Some polygraph questioning techniques have indeed produced high
accuracy rates (Bradley, et al.; Forman & McCauly, 1986; lacono & Lykken 1997). Other
methods, involving the use of statement transcript analysis, brain imaging, and cognitive
cue detection, have also shown promise for development into reliable lie detectors
(Pezdek, Morrow, Blandon-Gilton, Quas, et al., 2004). Unfortunately, each of these
techniques is limited. For example, the polygraph is vulnerable to countermeasures that
alter the very physiological responses that distinguish lies from truthful responses
(Bradley, MacLaren & Carle, 1996; Forman & McCauly, 1986; lacono & Lykken 1997).
Transcript analysis, brain imaging, and cognitive cue detection are limited by several
factors including utility across diverse samples, cost, and/or the need for further
validation research (Pezdek et al., 2004; Spence, Hunter, Farrow, Green, Leung, et al.,
2004; Walczyk, Mahoney, Doverspike, & Griffith-Ross, 2009).
In everyday life, circumstances often require humans to detect lies. Because lying
is a ubiquitous part of human interaction, people confront situations frequently when the
ability to detect deception would serve them well. Unfortunately, people are much more
adept at lying than detecting lies (Bond & DePaulo, 2008). People are often placed in
professional situations in which their ability to detect lies is crucial to their job
performance. Law enforcement agents, legal personnel, human relations staff, and health
care staff are among many professionals who are often required to determine the truth of
others' statements.
Psychologists are also called upon to detect lies. In psychological evaluation and
treatment, actuarial assessments are used to detect malingering, a type of lying involving
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the feigning of symptoms for personal gain (Pope, Butcher, & Seelen, 2006). For other
deception such as non-disclosure in therapy or supervision of trainees, psychologists must
rely on the same cues as laypersons to detect deception. In other words, without help
from lie detection technology, psychologists, like other human beings, may simply be
guessing at whether or not lies are occurring (Bond & DePaulo, 2008).
Many cues to deception have been identified that improve the accuracy of
people's efforts to detect lies (DePaulo, Epstein, & Wyer 1993). Behavioral cues include
non-verbal and verbal actions that help humans to distinguish lies from truthful
statements. In fact, interventions have been developed to train people to use these cues to
improve their lie detection accuracy. However, the greatest estimates of accuracy, even
with the best training, are only slightly above the level of chance (Bond & DePaulo,

2008).
Because of the poor performance of human lie detectors, Banikiotes and Merluzzi
(1981) and Dacy and Brodsky (1992) examined factors that might create a bias in how
the truthfulness of statements is inferred. Gender is among the factors that might bias
people's lie detection attempts through influencing judgments of credibility and
trustworthiness. (Banikiotes & Merluzzi, 1981; Dacy & Brodsky, 1992). DePaulo, Stone,
and Lassiter (1985) have further noted that gender differences affect the ability to detect
non-verbal cues relevant to deception detection. These findings suggest that gender has
an impact on the frequency with which people infer that deception is taking place. The
goal of this study was to determine how the tendency to infer lies might be influenced by
biological gender and gender-related personality attributes.
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Statement of the Problem
Efforts to detect lies are as old as the human race itself (Mitchell & Anderson,
1997). Still, human beings' ability to lie well surpasses their skills in lie detection. In fact,
untrained humans are only accurate at slightly above the level of chance (Bond &
DePaulo, 2008). With the goal of improving human lie detection, non-verbal cues that are
generally related to lying have been identified (DePaulo, Lindsay, Malone, Muhlenbruck,
Charlton, & Cooper, 2003). The most effective training programs have only increased
accuracy to slightly above the level of chance, approximately 64%, where a hit rate of 50
% is expected by chance (Bond & DePaulo). This suggests that other factors unrelated to
deception influence the inference that a lie is occurring (DePaulo, Stone, & Lassiter,
1985), perhaps gender.
Judgments of credibility and trustworthiness are influenced by gender (Banikiotes
& Merluzzi, 1981; Dacy & Brodsky, 1992). These constructs are theorized to influence
how people interpret "possibly deceptive" statements. If credibility and trustworthiness
influence the frequency of inferences of lies, it is possible that gender plays a role in
these inferences, as well. This study explored the hypothesis that gender and genderrelated personality attributions influence the frequency with which lies are inferred. There
are three key roles that are commonly involved in the evaluation of potential lies. The
potential liar, commonly called the sender, the recipient of lies, or target, and a thirdperson evaluator, or someone who observes the potential lie, but is not actually the
recipient. It is possible that the gender(s) of any of these parties involved might influence
whether lies are inferred.

Evidence suggests that gender influences many aspects of lie detection, such as
the interpretation of non-verbal behaviors. Rosenthal and DePaulo (1979) discovered that
women were more accurate at interpreting non-verbal cues. In situations with higher
"stakes," women lost their advantage such as when liars attempted to control their non
verbal behaviors. Women were more likely to interpret statements as being truthful than
were men, even when there was high motivation for the sender to lie (DePaulo, Epstein,
& Wyer, 1993). The goal of the present study was to investigate factors other than "cue
behaviors" that may bias lie inferences and, consequently, influence the accuracy of lie
detection.
DePaulo, Stone, and Lassiter (1985) investigated the effects of gender on the
accuracy of lie detection. Targets were more accurate at detecting lies told by women. Lie
detection was also more accurate when targets and potential liars were of the opposite
sex. Even though the gender of the target and the potential liar influence the accuracy of
human lie detection, it is not clear what specific behaviors account for the differences. In
other words, research efforts have not addressed why lies are more "detectable" in
women and by opposite sex senders. This study tested the hypothesis that the frequency
of lie inferences is influenced by gender and gender-related personality attributes.

Justification
Human beings have consistently been found to be poor at deception detection.
Research is needed on what factors irrelevant to deception nonetheless influence
inferences of lies. This situation is made more urgent by the fact that attempts to create
reliable technologies to detect lies have not been very successful, though several hold
promise for further development (Kozel, Padgett, & George, 2004; National Research
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Council, 2003; Walczyk, Mahoney, Doverspike, & Griffith-Ross; 2009). Gender is likely
an important factor that influences people to infer lies (Banikiotes & Merluzzi, 1981;
Dacy & Brodsky, 1992).
People make judgments of trustworthiness quickly, based on appearance alone
(Banikiotes & Merluzzi, 1981; Dacy & Brodsky, 1992; Porter, England, Juodis, Brinke,
& Wilson, 2008). Like other decisions that are made with small amounts of information,
trustworthiness judgments are resistant to change once they have been made (Carlson,
1990). Moreover, people are poor at distinguishing truly trustworthy individuals from
those who are untrustworthy (Porter et al., 2008). It seems that people inaccurately use
biases in judgments that will likely influence their behavior. One aim of the present study
was to identify factors that could bias judgments of trustworthiness, as well as understand
how such factors influence the inference of lies.
Research on the construct "credibility" also provides an impetus for the present
study. Credibility judgments are defined as an estimate of the ability of someone to
influence others (Hoyt, 1996). Trustworthiness is a component of credibility (Dacy &
Brodsky, 1992). Gender has been included among factors that influence judgments of
credibility (Banikiotes & Merluzzi, 1981; Dacy & Brodsky, 1992; Hoyt, 1996). Females
are found to be more trustworthy and credible than males (Dacy & Brodsky). It is logical
to infer that when someone is judged to be lower on credibility or trustworthiness, lies
will be inferred more often in that person. If the same factors that influence these
judgments also affect how people infer lies, then gender may play a role in lie inference,
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as well. For example, if person A, a female, were rated as "highly credible", but person
B, a male, were rated as "not credible", one would expect people to infer that person B
lies more often than person A.
Gender affects the ability to detect lies and succeed at lying. Women are usually
more accurate at interpreting non-verbal cues than men, but their advantage diminishes in
the "high stakes" situations in which lies are more common (Rosenthal & DePaulo,
1979). DePaulo, Epstein, and Wyer (1993) suggest that women are more likely to
interpret statements positively, or truthfully, than men. This was true even when there
was high motivation for the sender to lie. In effect, women are more likely to give the
sender the "benefit of the doubt". Others have shown that people are more accurate at
detecting lies in members of the opposite sex (DePaulo, Stone, & Lassiter, 1985). This
evidence supports the hypothesis that gender, indeed, plays a role in the accuracy of
human lie detection.
Considering gender's effects on lie detection accuracy (Rosenthal & DePaulo,
1979) along with the evidence that females are typically given higher ratings of
credibility and trustworthiness (Dacy & Brodsky, 1992), it is proposed that gender would
influence inferences of lies. Therefore, this study explored how biological gender and
gender-related attribution style of potential targets of lies and third-person evaluators
affected lie inferences. The gender of potential liars was also examined as a possible
influence on the frequency with which lies are inferred. These findings may advance
understanding of how people form biases that lead to poor lie detection accuracy.
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Literature Review
Lying in Human Development
Given lying's status as a social skill, it is important to first understand how
prevalent the behavior is in human interaction. Most people lie daily (DePaulo, Kashy,
Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996). In an effort to investigate the commonality of lying,
DePaulo et al. (1996) asked participants to complete a journal including detailed accounts
of daily social interactions in which they lied. The participants admitted to lies an average
of three times each day. Additionally, lying emerges at an early age, as do many other
common social behaviors. Most children engage in "deception-like" behaviors before age
two. For example, a child who knows his or her own name may respond "daddy" when
asked. These behaviors do not seem to be driven by the same influences that motivate
lying in later stages of human development. At approximately age three, children begin
telling lies for many of the same reasons as adults, including avoiding punishment or
gaining reward (Ruffman, Olson, Ash, & Keenan, 1993).
Although young children understand the concept and purpose of deception,
proficiency and sophistication at lying comes with age and experience (Ruffman et al.,
1993). Toddlers' lies are usually not as complex as those of adults. But, at age three
children are often able to prevent another person from obtaining an object by deception
(Ruffman et al., 1993). And even though young children are generally poor liars, they lie
with about the same frequency as older children who are more successful in their efforts.
Lewis, Stranger, and Sullivan (1989) found that three-year-olds would lie when they had
been asked not to peek at a toy after an experimenter left the room; 38 % of the children
lied. The same percentage told the truth. The remaining 24 % of the children did not

peek. The authors posit that children's lies are less effective because they do not take into
account that the target may not share their point of view. They may be limited by their
underdeveloped "theory of mind", that is their ability to accurately infer the mental states
of others (Lewis, Stranger, & Sullivan). These findings imply that lying develops from a
relatively primitive and ineffective behavior into a highly useful skill in adulthood.
Because of the prevalence of simple lies that are told by children, Mitchell and
Anderson (1997) believe that the ability to successfully deceive was selected through
evolutionary processes. Studies of animals have provided evidence that deception may
have an older evolutionary history than the human species. Non-human primates plan
simple deceptive behaviors, such as pointing in order to misdirect another away from
food (Mitchell & Anderson). Primates use deception to manage relationships, form
alliances, and attain higher social rank. The evolutionary goal is to ensure one's genetic
legacy (Adenzato & Ardito, 1999). The authors speculate that these are some of the same
factors that influence lying in human adults. Primates' ability to plan and execute
deceptive behaviors suggests that they are capable of thought processes sophisticated
enough to evaluate social rules, abilities, and consequences (Adenzato & Ardito). Due to
the presence of deceptive behaviors in non-human primates, it is probable that humans
have "always" used deception (Mitchell & Anderson).

Human Lie Detectors
Given the history of deception in human society and its potential costs (DePaulo
et al., 2003), efforts have been made to detect potentially detrimental deception. Human
beings are often called upon to serve as detectors. In fact, lie detection is a common
element of many human occupations (Bond, Omar, Pitre, Lashley, Skaggs, et al., 1992).
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Individuals in certain professions are better at detecting lies than others. For instance,
Secret Service agents are the most effective at lie detection. Federal officers, other law
enforcement personnel, and clinical psychologists, who are specifically trained in lie
detection, are more accurate in detecting lies than individuals in other professions (Bond
et al. 1992).
Attempts to detect lies are often based on the non-verbal behaviors of potential
liars (Bond et al., 1992). In fact, several "cues" have been commonly associated with
lying. Gaze aversion is a classic example of a stereotypical "symptom" of dishonesty. A
person averts his or her gaze by breaking eye contact, or simply looking away from the
target. Lie inferences commonly follow such cues. Bond et al. speculated that when the
norms for non-verbal behavior are violated, it becomes more likely that lies will be
inferred. They hoped to find predictable cues that could be used for lie detection (Bond et
al.).
To investigate their theory of expectancy violation, Bond et al. (1992) conducted
a study in which three diverse groups were videotaped exhibiting "weird" behaviors as
they truthfully described their feelings about people they knew. The weird behaviors
included eye closure, unusual staring, arm raising, and shoulder raising, but not more
conventional cues used to detect lies. The videos were later shown, without sound, to
peers who were asked to judge if the individuals in the videos were telling the truth or
lying. Individuals were likely to infer deception from any strange behavior. This study
was replicated with a group of illiterate citizens of India as participants. The authors
found similar results suggesting that the expectancy-violation model applies cross-
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culturally. The findings illustrate one of the reasons that people struggle to detect lies.
People often misperceive any unexpected non-verbal behavior as a cue to deception
(Bond et al.).

Cues to Deception
Efforts have been made to identify cues that humans can use to accurately detect
lies. Frank and Ekman (2004) discovered cues in several behaviors that could be used to
improve human efforts to detect lies. Cognitive cues include pauses, changes in rate of
speech, and errors in speech. These cues are theorized to occur because of the cognitive
load or effort that lying is thought to require compared to truth telling. Other cues may be
driven by emotions such as guilt and fear. Emotions that accompany lying are displayed
in voice tone, facial expression, and body posture cues (Frank & Ekman).
An influential meta-analysis of deception research identified 158 verbal and non
verbal cues to deception (DePaulo et al., 2003). There are many reliable verbal cues that
can be used for lie detection. For example, lies entail more words with negative
connotation such as neither, nor, none, no, etc. Deceptive statements convey more
negative emotion. When lying, people complain more than when they are telling the
truth. Lies are also less likely to have logical structure, and more likely to convey
ambivalence. Moreover, deceptive statements are "bereft of ordinary imperfections" that
are usually present in truthful statements (p. 104). An example of an imperfection in
truthful statements would be a spontaneous correction to an erroneous comment or fact of
the story (DePaulo et al.). The lack of imperfections may be due to a liar's attempt to
make a story as believable as possible. Also, truth tellers are likely to describe elements
of the setting of their stories while liars are more likely to describe peripheral
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relationships or events, which include characters' relationships to one another (DePaulo
et al.). Although, verbal cues are potentially useful to humans for detecting deception,
many must be taken in the context of long statements. Consequently, they are more useful
when completed statements are analyzed as a whole and compared to truthful accounts.
Behavioral non-verbal cues to deception include pupil dilation, voice pitch
fluctuations, and appearance, among others. These are useful for quick identification of
lies. Other non-verbal cues can be used in lie detection. For example, liars look "less
friendly" and have "less pleasant faces" than do truth tellers. Signs of tension (posture
shifts, change in blinking rate, gaze aversion, silent pauses, and sneers) are not reliable
cues; only general fidgeting is an effective cue (DePaulo et al., 2003). Trainers of human
lie detectors have used this information to improve the accuracy of their trainees. Recall,
however, that they have only been able to increase the accuracy the "best-trained"
students to approximately 64% (Bond & DePaulo, 2008).

Gender's Role in Lie Detection
The gender of the observer has been theorized to have a role in how cues to
deception are interpreted. There is evidence that women are more adept than men at
identifying and interpreting non-verbal behaviors (Rosenthal & DePaulo, 1979). Despite
their evident superiority, women lose their advantage specifically when trying to detect
deception. Rosenthal and DePaulo conducted several experiments to compare men and
women in their skills at detecting non-verbal cues. They found that women notice non
verbal behaviors more than men, and are more accurate in interpreting them. The authors
proposed that non-verbal cues are briefer when the sender attempts to control them, as is
often the case during lying. As the duration of cues decreased, women were less likely to
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interpret the cues negatively, and were likely to infer lies (Rosenthal & DePaulo).
Women seemed to have given senders the benefit of a doubt by not interpreting
ambiguous behaviors as deceptive.
Rosenthal and Depaulo (1979) went on to explore several potential reasons for the
pattern of women's lie detection performance. They proposed that certain types of cue
channels, such as excessive body movement, are "leaky" because they are difficult to
control (Rosenthal & DePaulo). To test their hypothesis, five measures of non-verbal cue
sensitivity were derived from the Profile of Nonverbal Sensitivity (PONS), a measure
designed to assess sensitivity to facial expression, body movements, and voice tone based
on high-speed (250 ms) exposure to such cues and discrepancies between tone of voice
and either facial expressions or body movements. It was proposed that women would be
less likely than men to notice cues from the leaky channels.
The results confirmed that females lost their advantage over men in reading
non-verbal behavior, while attempting to interpret cues that are difficult for liars to
control. The authors proposed that women attended to behaviors that were more easily
controlled, whereas men attended to the "leakier" channels of non-verbal behavior.
Discrepancies between the abilities of men and women to detect cues were accentuated
when lying was likely, such as when cues were shorter, or motivation to lie high
(Rosenthal & DePaulo, 1979).
In another experiment, Rosenthal and DePaulo (1979) tested the hypothesis that
women would be more "accommodating" of deceptive, non-verbal behaviors. The
researchers argued that it is likely that women are able to identify non-verbal cues from
leaky channels, but that they are more likely to interpret them positively as truthful
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(Rosenthal & DePaulo). To test their hypotheses, stimuli were created by videotaping 20
men and 20 women as they described someone they liked, someone they disliked, and
someone they felt indifferently towards. In one condition, participants described the
people they disliked as though they liked them and the people they liked as though they
disliked them, that is, deceptively. In the other condition, the participants gave truthful
descriptions. In a follow-up study, participants acted as lie detectors by indicating
whether they believed the statements in the videos to be truthful or deceptive. Women
interpreted deceptive cues incorrectly more frequently than men. Consequently, women
were less accurate lie detectors. The authors speculate that women are socialized to be
more accommodating than men. They go on to suggest that this is consistent with
feminine social roles in western society (Rosenthal & DePaulo).
DePaulo et al. (1993) also found evidence that women are more accommodating
in their interpretations of ambiguous cues than men (Rosenthal & Depaulo, 1979).
Realistic lying situations were the stimuli for this study, rather than attempting to isolate
non-verbal cues. Participants observed an audio/visual stimulus of a recorded interaction
between confederates and unsuspecting volunteers. To create the stimulus materials for
this study, several volunteers were given the opportunity to choose four paintings from an
art gallery. Two of the paintings were to be those that they liked most, and the other two
were to be the two they liked the least. Next, they were introduced to a confederate whom
they believed to be an art student. They were then asked to discuss their choices. The
confederate was not made aware of the volunteers' painting preferences. Regardless of
the choices, the confederate indicated that two of the chosen paintings were her own. One
group was given no instruction on how to interact with the art student/confederate. The
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other group was told to be polite. The final group was told to be honest, because doing so
would help the art student improve. Participants later viewed the videos as lie detectors,
and judged statements in the video presentations as truths or lies (DePaulo et al., 1993).
Female "lie detector" participants interpreted statements in a positive light more
frequently than male participants. This was true even when the motivation to lie or
exaggerate feelings was high; such as when individuals in the video described the
artist/confederate's own paintings. Females assumed more often than males that the
potential liar was telling the truth and not exaggerating. DePaulo et al. (1993) noted that
when individuals in the videos were accurately describing paintings they liked, females
were significantly more accurate than males at realizing how much the speaker actually
liked the paintings. Thus, women are not blind to people's feelings when they are telling
the truth (DePaulo et al., 1993). Authors speculated that these findings were also a
consequence of women's socialized tendency to assume honesty in others. The overall
implication is that women are less likely than men to infer deception.
Other gender-related factors affect the detectability of deception. DePaulo, Stone,
and Lassiter (1985) examined how motivation to conform affects the detectability of lies.
It was proposed that that senders speaking to opposite-sex targets would be more highly
motivated to be successful at deceiving than senders speaking to same-sex targets.
Authors believed that the attractiveness of the target would also be positively correlated
with the sender's motivation lie successfully. Finally, they believed that senders would be
more highly motivated to successfully deceive when feigning agreement rather than
disagreement (DePaulo et al., 1985). To test these hypotheses, participants were given a
list of topics to be discussed, along with the position that they were to defend in the
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discussion, often opposite of their own. They were also provided with a photograph of the
person with whom they would be discussing the topics and told that the individual in the
photo was on the other side of a one-way mirror. The individuals in the photos varied in
attractiveness. Actually, senders' discussions were videotaped. Another group of
participants subsequently assessed the stimuli under one of four conditions. Some of the
participants watched the audio/visual recording. In another condition, they listened to the
audio only. Another group watched the video recording with no sound. The final group
read verbatim transcriptions of the dialogue (DePaulo et al., 1985).
The hypotheses were confirmed. As motivation to succeed at lying increased, the
ability of others to accurately detect deception also increased. Lies told to a member of
the opposite sex were more detectable than those told to a member of the same sex. When
the targets were more attractive, senders were given lower sincerity ratings than senders
who addressed unattractive targets. Recall that the "targets" of lies in this study were
photographs of individuals with whom the senders believed they were addressing. The
investigators posited the motivation to make a positive impression on more attractive
targets caused an increase in the detectability of lies (DePaulo et al., 1985). Interestingly,
sincerity ratings were low, regardless of whether the sender was telling the truth or lying,
an indication of a possible bias that observers tend to be skeptical.
DePaulo et al. (1985) went on to explore whether elements of the interaction
influenced the detectability of lies. They found that lies involving feigned agreement
were more detectable than feigned disagreement, most frequently when the target was
more attractive. The authors speculated that attractive people are probably the targets of
lies, particularly feigned agreement, more often than unattractive people. It was inferred
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that senders are more likely to agree with attractive targets to make a good impression
(DePaulo et al.). Similar results occurred when the participants were exposed to
transcripts of the audio data. However, exposure to audio-only stimuli did not yield
significant results (DePaulo et al.), probably because different criteria for attractiveness
are applied to auditory information.
In summary, the identification of accurate cues to deception is important in
clinical, forensic, therapeutic, and evaluative settings in psychology and other
professions. Humans generally make poor lie detectors, even those receiving specialized
training. Misleading cues such as gender may influence the inference of lies. Research on
the influences of gender on the inference of lies in senders might have important clinical
significance for psychologists. It would be beneficial in psychological practice and in
other fields to understand the biases that influence inferences of deception. These factors
were tested in the current study and have implications for the therapeutic environment,
for instance, is deception more likely to be inferred in a client simply because he is male?

Trustworthiness
A trustworthiness judgment can be defined as an evaluation that another person is
likely to be a threat (Porter, England, Juodis, ten Brinke, & Wilson, 2008). Judgments of
trustworthiness are often made based on a first impression Porter et al. (2008)
hypothesized that judgments of trustworthiness are made quickly and confidence in these
judgments increases over time.
To evaluate the accuracy and stability of trustworthiness judgments, Porter and
colleagues (2008) compiled photos of Nobel Peace Prize winners, Order of Canada
winners, and pictures of individuals among America's Most Wanted criminals.
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Participants were asked to rate each picture on a scale of trustworthiness. Theoretically,
criminals' faces should have been labeled "untrustworthy", whereas the faces of the
Nobel Peace Prize winners and Order of Canada winners should have been rated as
"trustworthy" (Porter et al., 2008).
Participants were correct more often in identifying trustworthy faces (Nobel Peace
Prize and Order of Canada winners) than they were in identifying untrustworthy faces
(criminals). This suggests that people are more likely to judge an untrustworthy person as
trustworthy than the opposite. The assessments of trustworthy faces were still fairly
inaccurate, 56 % correct, slightly above chance. Untrustworthy faces were assessed
correctly only 48.8 % of the time, at the level of chance (Porter et al., 2008).
At the time they made their initial judgments, participants were also asked to rate
confidence in their judgments. Later, they were allowed to study the pictures for longer
intervals after which they again rated their confidence in their original judgments.
Confidence in the initial judgment remained stable, despite longer exposure to the
pictures, suggesting that an initial assessment persists. The essence of these findings is
that people can make judgments of trustworthiness based on appearance alone, and
judgments tend to be inaccurate (Porter et al., 2008). Related to deception, immediate
perception of a face as "trustworthy" may, decrease the accuracy of subsequent attempts
to detect deception. Facial appearance is not, however, considered a reliable cue.
Attributing trustworthiness based on appearance alone emphasizes the importance of
understanding gender's influence on the assessment of trustworthiness, especially if
judgments of trustworthiness are related to gender.
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Judgments of trustworthiness affect the counseling environment as well. Firstimpression judgments apply to counselors and clients and can have lasting effects on the
therapeutic relationship. Similarly, judgments of credibility, akin to trustworthiness, also
influence therapy (Dacy & Brodsky, 1992).

Credibility in Therapeutic Settings
Credibility judgments can be defined as evaluations of someone's skill at a
particular task. Trustworthiness and "expertness", or the perception of the person's ability
to perform, are components of credibility (Atkinson, Maruyama, & Matsui, 1978). In
therapeutic settings, several factors can influence how the therapist is perceived (Dacy
and Brodsky, 1992). To study this phenomenon, Dacy and Brodsky developed slides
showing magazine photos of three men and three women modeling clothing categorized
as informal, casual, and formal. Each gender was represented equally in each category.
Participants were shown the slides and asked to rate each person pictured on eight
credibility sub-factors. Formal attire was associated with significantly higher ratings on
"skill centered items" including expertise, knowledge, credibility, and organization.
Formal attire also correlated with higher ratings of trustworthiness, sympathy,
attractiveness, and friendliness. Females received higher ratings of expertise, sympathy
and trustworthiness than male therapists. The authors speculated that, among the
stereotypical gender roles assigned to women, are that they are often assumed to be more
nurturing and caring than men. Consequently, they have a "head start" when individuals
judge their credibility (Dacy & Brodsky).
Credibility studies have important implications for the study of deception.
Because female therapists are generally rated higher in trustworthiness (Dacy & Brodsky,
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1992), it can be hypothesized that lies will be inferred less in therapy settings when the
therapist is female. Outside of therapy, these findings imply that lies may be inferred less
when the sender is female. A gender bias, favoring females seems to exist (Dacy &
Brodsky). The speculation that feminine gender roles are, at least in part, the cause of the
gender disparity in trustworthiness ratings implies that the bias exists outside of the
therapeutic setting as well.
In summary, the research on credibility and trustworthiness add three important
pillars to the theoretical foundation of the current study. First, people are largely
inaccurate at judging trustworthiness based on a first impression (Porter et al., 2008).
Second, the desire to avoid others' negative evaluations influences the ability to detect
deception (DePaulo et al., 1985). Third, gender influences judgments of trustworthiness
and credibility, especially those made in therapeutic settings (Dacy & Brodsky, 1992). If
clients and therapists, as well as people in other professional or social environments, are
made aware of the tendency to assess credibility based at least partly on gender,
awareness of this misleading cue may help to overcome it. Thus, trustworthiness and
credibility judgments as well as inferences of lies could be based more on cues that are
more related to therapists' actual ability.

Psychologists Detecting Deception
Despite the large number of studies in the area of deception detection, holes exist
in the literature. In their review, Bond and DePaulo (2008) found that, in general, people
are no better at detecting deception than flipping a coin. The disparity between the
frequency of lying and people's ability to detect lies underscores a need to increase
understanding of the dynamics of lying, lie detection, and what causes individuals to infer
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lies. Psychologists are among the professionals who must rely on their ability to detect
deception. Moreover, psychologists are frequently called upon in litigation and in the
human relations arena to ascertain the veracity of statements, stories, or testimony
(Boccaccini & Brodsky, 2002). This is especially true in the assessment of malingering.

Malingering
Malingerers seek psychological services and other unwarranted benefits by
feigning symptoms, that is, they fake illness. Psychologists typically use psychological
assessments to detect malingering in clinical populations (Pope, Butcher, & Seelen,
2006). Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (MMPI-2) profiles, for example,
have long been used in forensic settings to assess malingering, based partly on the wealth
of research data on the variety of ways that have been used to cheat the test (Pope et al.).
In fact, several stereotypical MMPI-2 response patterns have been identified that are
based on various motivations for malingering. Elevations on validity and clinical scales
are often used to this end. For instance, the L scale is commonly referred to as the "lie
scale". Items on this scale were designed to detect deliberate attempts to answer
dishonestly. Specifically, L scale items identify underreporting of symptoms. Similar
scales are designed from questions that were written to identify defensiveness, overly
virtuous self-presentation, and inconsistent response patterns. The F and Fb scales can
also be used to identify the feigning or exaggerating of mental health problems (Pope et
al.). Other psychological tests have been designed specifically for the detection of
malingering such as the Test of Memory Malingering (Tombaugh, 1996) and the
Structured Interview of Reported Symptoms (SIRS) (Rogers, Bagby. & Dickens. 1992),
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among others. In forensic settings, improving the detection of malingering would
increase accountability of those seeking improper insanity or incompetency pleas (Pope
et al.).
In evaluation and treatment settings, other types of deception occur. Clients lie for
various reasons (Heilveil & Muehleman 1981). Even when cases do involve malingering,
expensive and time consuming psychological testing may not be feasible. Without the
benefit of assessment tools, psychologists are left with the same skills as laypeople.
Therefore, it would be advantageous for psychologists to understand if biases exist in the
tendency to attribute lies, especially in cases in which relevant psychological tests do not
exist.

Credibility of Expert Witness Testimony
Boccaccini and Brodsky (2002) found that several factors influence the perceived
credibility of clinicians' expert testimony. In their survey of potential jurors, 37 %
reported that they would be more likely to believe a psychologist expert witness from
their local community, while 23 % would be more likely to believe someone from out of
state. Other conditions that increased the perceived credibility of psychological testimony
include the psychologist's primary role (therapist vs. expert witness) and his or her
previous court experience, among several others. The results of this study underscore that
assessments of credibility are multi-determined (Boccaccini & Brodsky, 2002). Gender
was not one of the variables under consideration in this study, an oversight that was
addressed by the present research.
For psychologists in forensic settings, improving the understanding of deception,
lie detection and credibility are vital (Rogers. Bagby. & Dickens. 1992). In legal
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proceedings, life and death can literally hinge upon an expert's testimony, creating a
great demand for accuracy in the assessment of truth or deception. For example, in cases
of pleas of insanity and incompetence, psychologists are often called upon to evaluate
defendants' sanity and competence to stand trial. Evaluations often influence trial
outcomes and sentencing (Atkins v. Virginia, 2002). Injury trails, the credibility of the
defendant, attorney, and experts all factor into the outcome of the trial. Understanding
factors such as gender that might influence the inference of deception in others would
benefit forensic psychology.

Nondisclosure in Supervision
Clinical supervisors could also benefit from a greater understanding of possible
gender biases in their tendencies to infer lies. In a self-report of supervisee behaviors,
Yorman and Farber (1996) discovered that it is common for therapists-in-training to
consciously withhold clinical information from supervisors. Supervisees withhold
information to avoid punishment or reprimand, and to portray themselves in the most
favorable light. Neither experience nor age decreases the frequency of supervisees'
nondisclosure (Yorman & Farber). Using video and audio recordings did not reduce the
frequency of nondisclosure or distortion by supervisees (Wallace & Alonzo, 1994).
Consequently, clinical supervisors are left with the burden of deciding if their supervisees
are providing accurate information. If gender interactions significantly affect the
inference of lies, supervisors and clinicians alike should be made aware to guard against
gender bias in the inferences of lies
In summary, many professionals, psychologists included must rely on their ability
to ascertain the truth. However, evidence strongly suggests that human beings are poor lie
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detectors (Bond & DePaulo, 2008). Though cues have been identified that could improve
skills in lie detection, people are influenced by other factors including, but not limited to,
preliminary judgments of credibility and trustworthiness based on appearance alone. Not
only are these factors unreliable for use in lie detection, but also may create biases that
can influence the inference of lies. As an alternative to human lie detectors, various
technologies that minimize the role of humans in lie detection have been proposed.

Lie Detection Techniques
Polygraph Tests
Technology has been developed over several decades to identify physiological
responses that may occur with deception (Kircher & Raskin, 1998). The most common
instrument used to detect deception is the polygraph test. Polygraphs measure the
physiological responses of a person during a question-and-answer session. Theoretically,
physiological responses during deception are different when compared to the measures of
responses obtained when people are telling the truth. Variations may be due to the
heightened anxiety that is thought to occur during deception. Examiners are tasked with
comparing arousal responses caused by control test items (questions or choices) to those
caused by relevant test items to which examinees might lie. Typically, output readings of
heart rate, skin conductance, breathing rate, and blood pressure are used in polygraph
examinations (Kircher & Raskin).
Scoring criteria are applied to polygraph output to determine significant
elevations in arousal that would indicate a possible deceptive response. There is some
disagreement about what constitutes an elevated response (Honts, Raskin, & Kircher,
1994; Horowitz, Kircher, Honts, & Raskin, 1997; Kircher & Raskin, 1988; Podlesny &
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Raskin, 1978; Rovner, Raskin, & Kircher, 1979). A polygraph examiner can analyze data
either by being present during testing or by subsequently reviewing hard copies of the
data to draw conclusions. It is also possible for computer programs to be used to analyze
polygraph data. Further, there are also several ways to conduct polygraph questioning.
The most common administration technique is called the Control Question Test (CQT)
(Barland & Raskin, 1975; Kircher & Raskin, 1988; National Research Council 2003).
Control Question Test (CQT). The Control Question Test is a variant of
polygraph questioning based on the assumption that lying causes elevations in several
physiological indicators of arousal. Test administrators compare the feedback of
instruments that measure heart rate, skin conductance, blood pressure, and other
autonomic responses during control questioning to which the administrator knows the
answers, with responses to questions that may yield lies. Control questions frequently
include asking the test-taker to confirm his/her name, address, or social security number.
The accuracy of the CQT has been long been debated (National Research
Council, 2003). There is evidence that scoring methods for the CQT are generally biased
against innocent people. Effectively, honest responses are scored as deceptive or
inconclusive more frequently than lies are scored as inconclusive or as honest responses
(National Research Council; Patrick & Iacono). Furthermore, test administrators often
use "extra-polygraphic" data to influence their scoring, which can lower accuracy. This
means that a number of factors beyond the polygraph output influence scoring, often
resulting in the misinterpretation of inconclusive results as lies (National Research
Council; Patrick & Iacono). Test administrators also have the ability to control the
environment of the examinee. Environmental factors often influence levels of anxiety,
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potentially invalidating polygraph results (National Research Council). In fact, the results
of the CQT are rarely admissible in court because of validity concerns arising from these
complications (National Research Council).
Guilty Knowledge Test (GKT). Another variant of the polygraph exam, the
Guilty Knowledge Test (GKT) (Lykken, 1959), measures responses to multiple-choice
questions to which both the guilty person (perpetrator of a crime) and the examiner know
the correct answer (e.g., "What kind of gun was used to shoot Mr. Doe? Was it a 357
magnum.. .a sawed off shotgun... an AK-47... a Thompson automatic... or a .45 caliber
Glock?") (MacLauren, 2001). The administrator must be certain that the correct choice is
included among the foils. Knowing this, the examiner may see increased arousal when
the correct choice is presented to a perpetrator (Lykken). In theory, an individual without
incident-relevant knowledge will have the same physiological response to correct and
incorrect answer choices, as they would be unaware of the correct choice (Lykken, 1959).
The GKT uses control alternative choices in a multiple-choice format rather than
control questions. The design of the GKT theoretically eliminates the necessity for the
examinee to even provide an answer to a question. Sufficient arousal should be elicited
by the perception of the correct answer alone, which would suggest that the examinee has
intimate knowledge of the crime. Questions on the GKT can be asked multiple times to
improve the accuracy of the conclusion reached. MacLauren (2001) notes that if a
question is asked three times and has four alternatives (one guilty alternative and three
neutral alternatives), the mathematical likelihood that a person without crime-relevant
knowledge would show sufficient physiological response to the correct answer is/? =
.0156.
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The GKT has reportedly accurately detected "guilt" 80% of the time and
"innocence" 90% of the time (Bradley, Mac Lauren, & Carle 1996). A more recent meta
analysis of polygraph research estimates that the GKT is able to accurately detect lies
between 76% and 83% of the time (MacLauren, 2001). It is frequently difficult, however,
for an examiner to gain enough knowledge about a crime to develop proper questions
and/or choices for the test to be widely used. This technique demands that the examiner
knows specific details of the crime that are often unavailable to most without firsthand
knowledge of the circumstances of the crime. Moreover, an innocent individual may have
learned details of a crime that could make the results suggest guilt, thus producing a false
positive finding (Forman & McCauley, 1986).
Positive Control Test (PCT). A third form of polygraph questioning is called the
Positive Control Test (PCT). In this protocol, the examinee is instructed to tell a lie in
response to a yes or no question ("Tell me a lie, did you steal the exam from your
professors office?) He/she is then instructed to tell the opposite. ("Now tell me the truth,
did you steal the exam from your professor's office?). The test assumes that a guilty
person will show evidence a significant response when he/she tells the truth, as telling the
truth would incriminate a guilty person (Forman & McCauley, 1986). An innocent person
should theoretically show greater arousal to telling a lie. It is proposed that lying
naturally causes more arousal than truth telling.
Forman and McCauley (1986) found that the PCT is accurate up to 78% of the
time. Even better accuracy has been found when the test is paired with other polygraph
questioning techniques. When the PCT was paired with the CQT, examiners using the
combined format detected deception with 100 % accuracy. Despite favorable validity
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estimates, insufficient research exists on the PCT compared to other polygraph
techniques (Forman & McCauley, 1986).
Each polygraph technique has been found to have some efficacy for detecting lies.
Yet, rarely are the results of such tests admissible in legal settings. This is partly due to
the development of well-known countermeasures that allow liars to beat the polygraph,
thus undermining the validity of results.
Countermeasures. Regardless of which technique is used, countermeasures can
confound the results of a polygraph examination. Studies have shown that both the
Controlled Question and Guilty Knowledge Tests are vulnerable to countermeasures
(Honts, Hodes, & Ruskin, 1985). However, it is apparent that all variations of polygraph
questioning can be undermined by the use of countermeasures. One common
countermeasure involves self-inflicted pain during questioning. Pain heightens arousal.
Simply biting the tongue or the inside of the cheek at appropriate times during
questioning result in pain. If pain is caused during truthful answering, heightened arousal
during lying will not stand out as deceptive. The use of this countermeasure is
undetectable by the examiner and is well known by those who may be motivated to coach
potential subjects of polygraph exams (Honts et al.; National Research Council, 2003).
Muscle contraction has also been used as a polygraph countermeasure. This can
be accomplished by pressing a toe against the inside front of a shoe while answering
control questions. The idea behind this is that the physiological response caused by the
contracting muscles results in output sufficiently similar to lying to confuse examiners.
Using this countermeasure during both lying and truth telling confounds the comparisons
(Honts et al., 1985).
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Both of these countermeasures, as well as combinations of the two, have allowed
examinees to beat the polygraph (Iacono & Lykken 1997). Combinations of the two are
most effective. As evidenced by surveys done by Division 1 of the American
Psychological Association, the Society for General Psychology, none of the currently
used polygraph techniques are generally accepted (Iacono & Lykken).

Criteria-Based Content Analysis
Another technique for detecting lies is called Criteria-Based Content Analysis
(CBCA). This method was developed in the 1950s and was originally designed to assess
the credibility of verbatim transcripts of statements made by children alleging to be
victims of sexual abuse (Pezdek et al., 2004). Examples of criteria include the following.
Truthful statements will be logical and coherent (criterion 1) and a truthful person is more
likely to doubt his/her memory of the events than a liar (criterion 15). As noted
previously, CBCA uses 18 such criteria to determine the truth of a transcription resulting
from a structured interview. Trained judges can use CBCA to distinguish between true
and false statements in children with up to 86% accuracy. Though they are also
significantly better than chance, CBCA results are not as applicable to the statements of
adults (Pezdek et al.). Despite the promise that CBCA shows in distinguishing fabrication
from truth, it is not used as frequently as polygraph tests. To further call into question
CBCA's utility, the age of the child and the familiarity of an event can affect its accuracy
in assessing children's statements (Pezdek et al.).
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Brain Imaging
Technologies for measuring neurological activities also hold promise as lie
detection methods. Brain scanning techniques such as functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) are able to detect changes in neuronal metabolism due to activation in
corresponding brain areas (Spence, Hunter, Farrow, Green, Leung, et al., 2004). There
have been three seminal studies in the imaging of deception (i.e., Langleben Schroeder,
Maldjian, Gur, McDonald, Ragland, et al., 2002; Lee, Liu, Tan, Chan, Mahankali, et al.,
2002; Spence et al., 2001). In each study, participants were asked to perform deceptive
behaviors while being scanned in a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
device. Researchers have tested the suggestion that two processes are involved in forming
a deception: inhibition of truth and the formation of a lie. In other words, the brain must
expend energy to inhibit telling the truth and then to create a lie (Spence et al.). Inhibition
of the truth would, theoretically, activate regions of the ventral prefrontal cortex that are
typically activated during the inhibition of other responses. Further, it was believed that
lies would activate dorsolateral areas of the prefrontal cortex, which are implicated in
novel response generation (Spence et al.).
To test this theory, computerized protocols were administered to participants
during an fMRI scan requiring them to answer yes or no to a series of questions by
pressing a key that corresponded to each answer. Spence et al. (2001) found that areas of
the bilateral, ventrolateral, prefrontal and anterior cingulated cortices, all of which are
within the prefrontal region of the brain, evidenced activation during lying. The data
supported the hypothesis that prefrontal areas are active during the generation of lies. It
was concluded, however, that these activations were primarily associated with the
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inhibition of truthful responding rather than with the generation of a "novel" lie. Areas
associated with response generation were not activated. The researchers' prediction was
not confirmed. Findings partially supported the original hypothesis, but it is possible that
the yes or no answer pattern did not mandate that participants generate novel information
in order to lie, only reverse the truthful response (Spence et al.). Langleben et al., (2002)
noted the same activations when using GKT polygraph questioning techniques.
Rather than identifying individual areas activated by lying, Lee et al. (2002)
believed that unique neural "pathways" or activity patterns exist in the formation of
deception. To test this hypothesis, investigators instructed participants to feign symptoms
of memory loss while imagining that being successful in their deceit would result in a
large cash award. The fMRI data indicated that prefrontal areas correlated with
information manipulation and the control of executive functioning were active, along
with a dorsolateral prefrontal region that has been implicated in performance anticipation
and explicit memory retrieval (Lee et al.). Areas of the parietal and temporal lobe, as well
as the subcortical caudate and posterior cingulate, were also active. These areas have
been associated with calculated responding, visual imagery, and the inhibition of
obedience to rules. In sum, these authors have made a strong case for the existence of
neural pathways for deception. Unlike the other two studies, this situation was specific
and involved rather complex deception. Further research may replicate the findings as
well as identify similar neural activity patterns associated with all deceptive behavior
(Lee et al.).
Although imaging studies involving fMRI-scanning technology hold promise for
the detection of deception, further investigation is warranted to understand the roles of
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specific areas in lying behavior (Kozel, Padgett, & George, 2004). Further, consistent
activation patterns have not been identified across individuals due to a variety of
individual differences in physiology. Further research is needed to identify patterns that
can be used for deception detection across individuals (Kozel et al.). These techniques are
also presently cost-prohibitive and lying situations of the experiments lack ecological
validity (Spence et al. 2002). Due to limited access and high cost, there is inadequate
research on brain imaging for lie detection (Spence et al., 2001; Kozel et al.). As
equipment improves, neuroscience advances, and operating costs are reduced, the fMRI
brain imaging techniques may yield an effective way to detect deception, but that is years
away (Kozel et al.).

Cognitive Lie Detection
Results of brain imaging studies have led to theories regarding the use of
cognitive cues to deception. It is proposed that lying requires more cognitive effort than
truth-telling (Vrij, Leal, Par, Mann, Fisher, Hillman et al., 2009; Vrij, Mann, Fisher, Leal,
Milne, & Bull, 2008; Walczyk, Roper, Seeman, & Humphrey, 2003; Walczyk et al.,
2009; Walczyk, Schwartz, Clifton, Adams, Wei, & Zha, 2005). Along these lines,
Walczyk et al. (2003) propose the Activation-Decision Construction Model (ADCM) of
lying that posits three stages in the formation of a lie response. During the activation
stage, a question activates the memories of the truth, from long-term memory. Once the
truth is active in working memory, the decision stage follows. More cognitive energy is
spent in the decision making process. Semantic and episodic memories of the truth are
then utilized to anticipate the potential costs and benefits of truthfulness. If the costs are
acceptable, the individual often decides to tell the truth. If they are too high, a decision to
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lie will be made. The individual must then construct a lie. This begins the construction
stage. Long-term memory is accessed again in order to construct a lie that is appropriate
to the situation. (Walczyk et al., 2003; Walczyk et al., 2005; Walczyk et al., 2009). Based
on this theory, liars take more time to answer, as lying requires the decision and
construction stages whereas truth telling only involves truth activation. Furthermore, the
authors posit that lying increases the frequency of inconsistent answers over truth telling
because lies are less detailed than corresponding truths.
To test these hypotheses, Walczyk and colleagues (2009) randomly assigned
participants to one of two groups: truth-tellers and unrehearsed liars. Each group was
instructed to answer a series of questions as quickly as possible. A computer program
randomly presented questions that were read from a computer screen by an experimenter.
Response times were measured from the last word of each question to when the
participants answered each question. Several question pairs were checked to determine
the logical consistency of participants' answers. Analyses revealed that liars had
significantly longer response times (about 230ms) than truth-tellers. Lying was also
shown to increase the frequency of inconsistencies (Walczyk et al.).
Researchers went on to hypothesize that response time and inconsistencies would
discriminate truth-tellers from both rehearsed and unrehearsed liars. To test this, a group
of participants were given an opportunity to rehearse their lies prior to the experimental
procedure. This group was given ten minutes to study the list of questions. They were
instructed to lie to all questions. The same computer programs described above were used
for the questioning and gathering of response time data.
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Response time for rehearsed liars was still significantly longer than that of
unrehearsed liars and truth-tellers, but shorter than rehearsed liars. Rehearsal lowers the
cognitive load of lying, but not to the level of truth telling. These studies support the
ADCM and the efficacy of cognitive approaches to lie detection. However, the authors
note that lying is a cognitively complex task, and that cognitive lie detection techniques
need much refinement (Walczyk et al.).
Vrij et al. (2008) proposed that increasing cognitive load on liars could help
human lie detectors to be more accurate. They speculated that, if the task of lying is more
difficult, liars should display more signs of cognitive load than truth tellers. To test this
theory, researchers engaged a group of participants in a situation in which they were
falsely accused of a theft. Members of a second group of participants each committed a
staged theft. They were given an alibi and told to lie when they were questioned about the
money they had stolen. Both groups were later questioned under the pretense that they
were suspected of taking money out of a wallet. Half of the participants in each group
were instructed to simply recount the details of their experience naturally. The remaining
participants were instructed to tell the interviewer the story in reverse chronological order
in order to increase the cognitive load. The questioning sessions were videotaped and
transcribed. Transcripts were coded for cues based on the details and cues exhibited by
participants. Researchers hypothesized that each coded behavior is a sign of increased
cognitive loading (Vrij et al.).
They found that, in the reverse order condition, liars included less auditory
information. In other words, they described sounds and conversation with less frequency
than truth tellers and those who told stories in chronological order. Also, reverse-order
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liars provided fewer details about the spatial aspects of events (where things were located
or how things moved) and more details about their own thoughts and feelings. Reverseorder liars hesitated more in their speech, spoke more slowly, and made more speech
errors than truth tellers. Once again, each of these cues is believed to be a sign of
increased cognitive load. Vrij et al. (2008) also observed more signs of anxiety including
leg and foot movements, and increased blinking in reverse-order liars' behaviors. In the
control condition (chronological order), liars moved hands and fingers significantly less
than truth tellers. Apparently, liars were attempting to control the movements of their
body. No other differences were identified between liars and truth tellers when stories
were told in normal chronological order (Vrij et al.).
Virj et al. (2008) tested a method of human lie detection based on cognitive cues.
Participants in this study were all police officers who watched the videos from the
experiment described above. Each officer watched 12 interviews. The participants in the
videos had been asked to recount the story in reverse chronological order. After each
video clip, officers were asked three questions: "Do you think the suspect is telling
(truth/lie)?" "To what extent does the person in the video look as if he/she is having to
think hard?" and "To what extent does the person in the video look nervous?" The final
two questions were answered on a Likert-type rating scale. Officers who viewed clips of
stories told in reverse order were significantly more accurate (60%) at detecting lies than
those who watched the stories in chronological order (42%). The 60% accuracy is also
better than chance for lie detection in general. Truth detection was slightly less accurate:
56% for the reverse-order condition, and 50% in the chronological order control. Total
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accuracy (truth and lie detection) was significantly higher for the reverse order condition
(58%) than for the control condition (46%). Interestingly, the reverse order accuracy is
better than chance, though the authors note that accuracy is not "high" (Vrij et al.).
Another method of increasing cognitive load proposed by Walczyk et al. (2005)
and later tested by Vrij et al. (2009) is to ask unanticipated questions. Doing so is
theorized to increase the number of inconsistencies between allegedly corroborating
stories. In order to test this theory, Vrij et al. created a situation in which one group of
paired participants was accused of a theft. Each pair was actually elsewhere during the
alleged commission of the crime; they had a true alibi. Another group was given a false
alibi, but had actually committed the theft. During questioning, the participants were
interviewed individually, that is, with the other member of their pair absent. The number
of inconsistencies between stories was collected later.
Analyses of the results showed that asking unanticipated questions enhances lie
detection by increasing the number of inconsistencies between the answers of the
members of each pair. As another surprise, one of the tasks was to have each participant
independently draw the layout of his or her location during the crime. Inconsistencies
between pairs' drawings allowed interviewers to detect truths with 80% accuracy and lies
with 75% accuracy. Inconsistencies in other details also showed significant elevations
among liars. The investigators assert that the unanticipated nature of the tasks and
questions that were asked during the interview increased the number of inconsistencies
between the pairs. These questions and tasks served a twofold purpose. First,
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unanticipated elements in an interview eliminate some of the effects of preparation. The
second purpose of the unanticipated elements is to increase the cognitive complexity of
the interview and, thus, increase cues to deception (Vrij et al., 2009).
Cognitive lie detection represents a prospective shift in human and technology
based techniques for detecting lies. Investigators propose that lying is more cognitively
complex than telling the truth and that increasing the cognitive effort required to lie by
accessing the truth in novel ways serves to increase the accuracy of lie detection. This is
an emerging and promising trend in the lie detection literature.

Summary
Lying is an important behavior in human society that develops with experience
throughout the lifespan (DePaulo et al., 1996). As with other socialized behaviors,
children learn to lie more effectively as they age (Ruffman et al., 1993). In fact, lying has
enhanced survival in non-human social animals. Capuchin monkeys engage in simple
deceptive behavior suggesting that evolutionary processes have selected lying due to its
benefits for the species (Mitchel & Anderson, 1997). Despite the apparent social benefit
of lying, deception can cause social problems in many situations by undermining or
misinforming others, who then go on to make poor decisions.
Lying is often reinforced in human society because, even with training, humans
are largely unsuccessful at deception detection. Untrained human lie detectors are
actually about as accurate as simply guessing (Bond & DePaulo, 2008). In an effort to
reduce the cost related to lying, efforts have been made to improve human lie detection
accuracy. Many techniques involve the identification of behavioral "cues" to deception.
Over 158 verbal and non-verbal cues to deception have been identified (DePaulo et al.,
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2003). Unfortunately, people are generally not attuned to these cues. Moreover, some
cues may be too subtle to be measured without the aid of technology. Individuals trained
in lie detection are still only slightly above the level of chance accuracy (Bond et al.,
1992).
People also struggle to detect lies because biases involved in lie inferences may
exist. Studies by DePaulo et al. (1985), DePaulo et al. (2003), and Rosenthal and
DePaulo (1979) have shown how characteristics of the various individuals in social
interactions influence the "detectability" of lies. For example, women are more skilled at
detecting and interpreting non-verbal cues. However they tend to overlook the same cues
when deception is more probable and assume that others are being truthful. Social
learning, theoretically, teaches women to perceive as more intensely unfavorable the
consequences from inferring lies than men. Women may also wish to give senders the
"benefit of a doubt." Consequently, women are often less accurate than men in detecting
deception (Rosenthal & DePaulo,).
Gender plays a role in the detectability of lies in other ways. Rosenthal and
DePaulo (1979) found that in opposite sex target-sender dyads, the sender was more
motivated to succeed at lying. If the sender "tries too hard" to cover lies, he/she provides
more cues (Rosenthal & DePaulo). This finding is particularly relevant to the current
study. The interaction between the gender of the sender and the gender of the target was
evaluated in present research to determine if gender biases influences the frequency with
which lies are inferred.
In summary, multiple factors influence how people decide if someone is lying or
telling the truth (Porter et al., 2008). Trustworthiness and credibility are two broad
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constructs that are related to how people form inferences of deception (Dacy & Brodsky,
1992; Porter et al.). Trustworthiness judgments are made based on an appearance-based
"first impression'*. People are more accurate in judging trustworthy faces than
untrustworthy ones. Enduring biases are likely to influence behaviors based on these
unreliable judgments, namely inference of lies (Porter et al.). In therapeutic settings,
formality of attire and gender influence judgments of credibility, which are commonly
higher for female therapists (Dacy & Brodsky).
Studies of credibility and trustworthiness suggest that gender may influence the
inference of lies. The current study took the "next step" in assessing directly how gender
of the sender, the target and the observer influence the inferences of lies. This is
especially relevant to the field of psychology. Clinical psychologists' judgments of
clients' truth or deception potentially have profound implications for their clients.
Psychological testing improves the accuracy of detection, but is far from failsafe (Pope et
al., 2006). Though many assessments can detect subtle forms of deception, testing is not
always necessary (Pope et al.). Therefore, psychologists are often left to use the same,
unreliable, methods for detecting deception as laypeople.
To further summarize, the ubiquity of damaging lies has led many investigators to
use technology as a mechanism for detecting lies. Polygraph-based techniques are
examples of technological lie detectors that measure various indicators of physiological
arousal. The device is based on the assumption that greater arousal results from deception
than from truth telling. Several questioning techniques have been developed for use with
the polygraph. Each format has yielded varying success rates and limitations to its utility
(Bradley et al., 1996; Forman & McCauley, 1986; National Research Council, 2003). All
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forms of the polygraph are susceptible to countermeasures such as intentionally causing
pain or tensing muscles during truthful answering which can cause sufficient arousal to
mimic the physiological responses to lies (Honts et al., 1985; National Research Council,
2003). For all these reasons, the polygraph has fallen out of favor and there has been a
call nationally for the development of alternative methods of lie detection (National
Research Council).
To provide further summary, several other methods of lie detection have been
developed with varying degrees of success. One method of analyzing written transcripts
of statements called CBCA (Pezdek et al., 2004). Other methods involving
neuro-imaging such as fMRI scanning have demonstrated effectiveness for detecting lies
in some cases, but are in need of much refinement and validation (Langleben et al., 2002;
Lee et al., 2002; Spence et al., 2001). Moreover, they are presently too costly and
impractical (Kozel et al., 2004).
Brain imaging studies have shown that several areas of the brain are activated
during lie detection, leading Walczyk et al. (2005) to propose that lying causes greater
cognitive load than truth-telling which may reveal itself in signs of cognitive load. The
ADCM, is a model that illustrates how lying can be a more demanding cognitive task
than telling the truth (Walczyk et al., 2005). Studies testing the ADCM have shown that
the cognitive load of lying significantly increases the response time to answer (Walczyk
et al., 2009). Increasing the cognitive load on the liar, such as by asking unanticipated
questions, also improves the accuracy of human lie detection by increasing frequency and
intensity of cues that can be used to detect lies. However, cognitive lie detection
techniques are still in the early stages of development (Vrij et al., 2008; Vrij et al., 2009).
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As with other the methods of lie detection, more refinement is necessary to improve
cognitive techniques before operational lie detectors can be achieved (Walczyk et al.,
2009).

The Current Study
Current lie detectors are too inaccurate to be relied upon (National Research
Council, 2003). Because people are so inaccurate, and highly effective lie detection
technologies have yet to be developed (DePaulo et al., 2003), it is important to
understand how and when humans infer that another person is lying, irrespective of the
accuracy of those inferences. Gender, an unreliable cue to deception (DePaulo et al.) may
nonetheless have a large impact on the inference of lies. Understanding how gender
might bias the inferences of lies can bring to light a factor irrelevant to deception that
people rely on as a cue. Such knowledge can help clinicians and other professionals be
more accurate lie detectors.
Inferences are judgments that a statement is a "truth" or a "lie", regardless of
accuracy. One goal of this study was to determine if the gender of a potential liar and that
of a target influence the frequency of lie inferences. If factors that influence judgments of
credibility also influence the inference of lies, it is expected that gender plays a crucial
role in the inference of deception. The study directly tested the theory that women infer
lies less frequently than men, because they are more accommodating (DePaulo et al.,
1985). The present research departs from previous research that has explored lie detection
accuracy. The current study was designed to determine if gender influences targets and
third party observers' inferences of lies, regardless of the accuracy of those inferences.
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To study the influence of gender on the inference of lies, participants were
exposed to one of four levels of a stimulus: audio-visual (target perspective), audio-visual
(third-person perspective), audio only, and verbatim written transcript. The levels of the
stimulus varied the amount and type of information that was available to third-party
observers. If gender is a potent factor in the inferences of lies, it might, for instance, have
its largest impact in the audio-visual third-person perspective. This design mimics that of
DePaulo et al. (1985). The stimuli were developed from four interactions between dyads
of confederates posing as an interviewer and an interviewee. Dyads were composed of all
possible gender combinations of interviewer (sender) and interviewee (target): malemale, male-female, female-male, and female-female. The sender adopted the role of an
interviewee for a position at a competitive internship in psychology. The interviewee
answered a series of 24 questions (see Appendix A) posed by the target. Interviewees
were instructed to lie to half (12) of the questions. Participants (target/third-person
evaluators) were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions and were exposed to all
four sender-target dyads. They indicated on a questionnaire if they believed each of the
interviewee's answers to be the truth or a lie as well as their confidence in each inference
using a Likert scale. Participants also completed of gender-specific personality
attributions and social desirability. Hypotheses and justifications are given below.

Hypothesis 1
Participants in the target condition will infer lies more often when the
potential liar is of the opposite sex of the participant than when the potential liar is
the same sex as the participant DePaulo et al. (1985) argued that lies told to a member
of the opposite sex were more detectable than those told to someone of the same sex due
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to a higher motivation to succeed, which involves more attempted control of behavior. It
is possible that targets are more accurate when judging the lies of a member of the
opposite sex simply because they infer lies more often. This will apply across conditions,
even when non-verbal behaviors are not available as in the transcript condition.

Hypothesis 2
Participants in conditions having equal exposure to the potential liar and the
target (all conditions except "target") will infer lies more often when they are the
opposite sex of the potential liar than when they are the same sex as the potential
liar. DePaulo et al. (1993) found that women were more accommodating in their
interpretation of non-verbal cues to deception. In other words, they were more likely to
give liars the "benefit of the doubt", but were less likely to accurately detect lies.
Previous research has not directly addressed how the gender of the potential liar and the
target influence the inferences of lies by third-person evaluators. This hypothesis
examined inferences of lying from the perspective of an individual outside of the
target/sender dyad. This hypothesis allowed examination of any changes in the tendency
to infer lies based on the gender of the participant, the liar, and the target. This should
apply across conditions, even in those in which non-verbal behaviors are not available.

Hypothesis 3
Male participants will infer lies more often than female participants in all
conditions except in the transcript condition, when non-verbal cues are unavailable.
DePaulo et al. (1985), DePaulo et al. (2003), and Rosenthal and DePaulo (1979)
proposed that women are more accommodating than men in their interpretations of
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possible nonverbal cues to deception. This is particularly true of non-verbal cues that are
less controllable and of shorter duration. Women's positive interpretations of ambiguous
cues may underlie their lower detection accuracy. In the present research, if women are
more accommodating than men in their interpretation of non-verbal cues, they should
infer lies less often than men. If the previous findings are accurate, males and females
should infer lies with equal frequency when non-verbal cues are unavailable in the
transcript-only condition.

Hypothesis 4
Among female participants, there will be a negative relationship between
femininity and the number of lies inferred. DePaulo et al. (1985), DePaulo et al.
(2003), and Rosenthal and De Paulo (1979) suggest that women are socialized to be more
accommodating in their inferences of lies. If true, it is likely that females with higher
scores on a scale of femininity will infer lies less frequently than those with lower scores.
Females who, as adults, exhibit more feminine characteristics have likely received more
reinforcement for more feminine behaviors including being accommodating of non
verbal cues to deception.

Hypothesis 5
Among male participants, there will be a negative relationship between
femininity and the number of lies inferred. DePaulo et al. (2003) and Rosenthal and
DePaulo (1979) suggested that social learning processes reinforce women to become
more accommodating in their interpretation of non-verbal cues, especially those relevant
to deception. If social learning inculcates a tendency in females to be more
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accommodating in their interpretation of non-verbal cues, it is a logical corollary that
men who exhibit more feminine characteristics and behaviors will have similarly been
reinforced through social learning to have been more accommodating of ambiguous
social cues.

Hypothesis 6
Lies will be inferred less often when liars are female than when they are
male. Dacy and Brodsky (1992) found that women received higher ratings of
trustworthiness as therapists. Women's ratings were attributed, by these authors, to be the
result of stereotypical gender roles inculcated in females to be caring and nurturing,
giving them an advantage in trustworthiness. Unfortunately, the authors did not address
the behavioral consequences of judgments of trustworthiness for instance, if they extend
to inference of deception. Though it is possible that people do not consider these initial
judgments of trustworthiness when inferring that another person is lying, it is
hypothesized that people will infer lies according to their original judgments influenced
by their assessments of trustworthiness. In other words, because women are considered
more trustworthy than men in general, lies will be inferred more in women than men.
This hypothesis applies across experimental conditions.

CHAPTER TWO

METHOD

Participants
A total of 309 participants were recruited for this study. The sample was made up
of 103 males (33%) and 206 females (67%). The mean age of participants was 38.99
years (SD = 16.05). Ages ranged from 18 to 77. By race the largest %age of participants
was Caucasian (n = 208) (67.3%). Other ethnicities included African American (n = 87)
(28.2%), Hispanic American (n = 5) (0.02%), Asian American (n= 1) (.003%), and those
who self-classified as "other" (n - 8) (0.026%). Participants were drawn from a
population of college students and a population of mental health professionals. The use of
human participants was approved by the Human Use Committee at Louisiana Tech
University (See Appendix B).
Undergraduate and graduate level student participants were recruited from
psychology classes at a medium-sized southern university (n = 119). Of student
participants, 51 were male (42.9%) and 68 were female (57.1%). With regard to the
academic classification of students, 48 were graduate students (40.3%) and 71 were
undergraduates (51.7%). The mean age of the student participants was 24.85, with a
range from 17 to 53 years of age. Students varied on academic major/concentration
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Students were primarily Caucasian in ethnicity (n = 84). African Americans were the
second most common ethnic group (n = 27); only one student identified him/herself as
Hispanic American and one as Asian American. All other ethnic groups were described
as "other" (n = 6).
Participants were also recruited from a group of mental health professionals
attending a professional seminar series for the purposes of continuing education (n = 190)
as required for the maintenance of their licensure in Louisiana. Of these participants,
there were 52 males (27.4%) and 138 females (72.6%). The mental health professionals'
ages ranged from 24 to 77, with a mean age of 47.85 years. The most prevalent ethnicity
of these participants was Caucasian as well (n = 124) (65%). Other ethnicities included
African American (n = 60) (31.6%), Hispanic American (n = 4) (.02%) and those who
self-identified as "other" (n = 2) (.01%). The size of the overall sample was large enough
to accurately detect various effect sizes in the population. Cohen (1992) recommended a
sample size of N = 63 for an ANOVA using four groups. Using a group of 309 should
allow small to medium effect sizes to be detected (Cohen, 1992).
At the time of recruitment, participants were randomly assigned a group number.
Based on the number, the student participants were given a choice of several appointment
times during which their experimental condition would be administered. For mental
health professionals, the number indicated the seminar during which they would
participate in the experimental procedures. All participants were exposed to one of the
following four conditions. They were as follows: the target group (a) (n = 59) watched
an audio-visual stimulus of an interview. In the target stimulus, the interviewee alone was
visible to the participant. The third-person evaluator group (b) (« = 71) watched an audio
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visual stimulus in which both parties were visible to the participant. The audio-only
group (c) (n = 80) listened to the audio that was isolated from the video stimuli used in
the previous two conditions. Finally, the transcript group (d) (n = 99) read a verbatim
transcript that included all of the verbal data from the stimuli in the other conditions (see
Table 1). Group sizes unequal because of the occasional inability of participants to
complete the data collection procedure at the dates and times that were offered.

Table 1
Participants in Each Stimulus Condition
Condition
Target
3 rd Person Observer
Audio-only
Transcript-only
Total

n
59
71
80
99
309

Male
27
18
23
34
103

Female
32
53
57
64
206

Instrumentation
A group of doctoral students were recruited to participate as confederates (n = 6)
who would assist in the creation of stimulus materials that would later be used during
data collection. Half were males. They completed the same demographic questionnaire,
as did the participants. The questionnaire is described later (see Appendix C). Each
confederate either played the role of an interviewer (n = 2) or a sender (n = 4) in the
creation of an audio-visual recording. Interviewers included one male and one female.
Interviewees included two females and two males. Confederates were instructed to
complete a short, videotaped interview during which they answered a series of questions
either truthfully or deceptively. They were further instructed to appear as sincere as
possible. Confederates were given a list of the 24 questions that would be asked. The
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experimenter randomly chose which 12 of the questions all senders would answer
deceptively and the other 12 that would be answered honestly. By having both male and
female senders lie to the same set of questions, it was assured that gender was not a cue
to deception After it was established that confederates accurately understood the
instructions, they were allowed to take the list of questions home to prepare their
answers. The videotaped interview occurred within 48 hours of the confederates
receiving the materials from which to rehearse. A copy of the stimulus questionnaire
(Appendix A) was provided to each interviewee (sender) when they arrived for their
videotaped interview. On this form, they indicated those questions that were answered
truthfully or with lies. In each case, interviewees followed instructions properly about
which questions were to be lied to and which ones were to be answered honestly. They
later wrote down truthful answers to each question so that the answers given during the
interview could be checked against them to ensure questions that were to be answered
deceptively and so forth. Interviewees followed directions properly in each case.

Video Procedure
The aforementioned group of confederates assisted in the creation of stimulus
materials. Each confederate was videotaped answering 24 questions in an interview
setting. Later, participants were randomly assigned to engage the stimuli in one of four
conditions as described below.

Condition A: "Target" Condition
For the target condition, audio-visual recordings were made using a digital video
camera, which was positioned so that only the interviewee was visible to the participants
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(Appendix D, Camera 1). The digital video file was stored and edited on a MacBook
Pro® laptop computer using iMovie® software. All videos were displayed using the same
classroom video equipment for all student participants. Due to the size of the audience, a
larger display was used for the group of mental health professionals. For the student
group, the audio for all conditions was broadcast using a small portable speaker system.

Condition B: "Third-Person Evaluator" Condition
Each interview was simultaneously videotaped from another angle (Appendix D,
Camera 2). A digital video camera, recording at the same video quality as that used for
the condition A stimulus, was used to create the video for condition B. Camera two was
positioned such that both the interviewer and the interviewee were equally visible in the
shot. The seats were arranged so that more than just the profile of the interviewer and
interviewee were visible in the frame. As pictured in Appendix D, the chairs were turned
45 degrees in order to increase the visibility of both confederates. Digital video files were
stored and edited on a MacBook Pro® laptop computer using iMovie® software.

Condition C: Audio Only Condition
The audio from the recordings was later stripped of the video using iMovie®
software on a MacBook Pro® laptop computer. The audio files were the stimulus for
participants in condition C. These recordings were thus the same as those for conditions
A and B. All audios for audio/visual and audio only conditions were played through the
same speaker system for all student participants. A different system was used for the
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mental health participants due to the size of the audience. Using the same audio and
delivery systems established as much consistency between the stimuli presentations as
possible.

Condition D: "Transcript Only" Condition
Finally, a verbatim transcript was developed using Microsoft Word® word
processing software. Specifically, the audio data were typed verbatim into a Microsoft
Word document (.docx) and printed using 10-point font. The transcript included all
utterances of confederates. Including non-word utterances such as "um", "uh", etc.
allowed participants in the transcript condition to be presented with "as accurate as
possible" representations of the audio data in the absence of sound. Each question asked
in the interview was included in the transcript, along with the answers. The names that
were used in labeling the source of the utterances made clear the gender of the speaker.

Measures
The following measures were administered to all participants.
The Personal Attributes
Questionnaire
The Personal Attributes Questionnaire (Helmreich, Spence, & Wilhelm, 1981)
(PAQ) is a 24-item instrument that measures the degree to which stereotypically
masculine or feminine adjectives apply to the respondent. It is divided into three scales,
"Instrumentality", "Expressivity", and "Androgyny". Items are designed such that
participants must make a self-evaluation along the continuum between two poles.
Instructions state that participants should "...choose a letter which describes where you
fall on the scale." For instance, an item could read ''Not at all artistic A...B...C...D...E
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Very Artistic' (Spence & Helmreich, 1978). All of the adjectives in the PAQ are
considered desirable regardless of the gender of the person who possesses them. The
complete scale appears in Appendix E. All 309 participants completed this measure.
Thus, there were no missing data.
High scores on the instrumentality scale suggest a "masculine" description applies
to them. This scale consists of eight items to which respondents are asked to rate the
degree to which they believe adjectives are self-descriptive. Stereotypically, men are
thought to possess the traits of the adjectives on these items more frequently than women.
Spence and Helmreich (1978) emphasized "self-assertiveness", as the most
stereotypically masculine trait.
The expressiveness scale, or Femininity scale, also includes eight items.
Accordingly, respondents indicate the degree to which they believe adjectives
characterize them. The adjectives on this scale describe characteristics that have been
stereotypically possessed by women. All of these adjectives describe traits that are related
to interpersonal interactions.
The remaining eight items measure "androgyny". This scale is currently titled
Masculinity-Femininity or M-F. Items on this contain mixed gender-related content.
Respondents rate themselves on the adjectives "aggressive" and "dominant" on the M-F
scale. These are considered the instrumental items. The remaining six items are
suggestive of emotional vulnerability (Helmreich, Spence, & Wilhelm, 1981).
For scoring purposes, point values ranging from one point to five points are
assigned to each letter (A=l, B =2, etc.). The sum of the point values for items in each
scale comprises the total score for that scale. Therefore, the scores in each scale can range
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from 8 to 40. A score of 8 on the Masculinity scale indicates the lowest level of
masculinity possible on the instrument, and so forth (Helmreich, Spence, & Wilhelm,
1981). Participants' scores on the Femininity scale were used to test Hypothesis 4 (H4),
which states that females with higher scores on a scale of femininity would infer lies less
frequently than those with lower scores. They were also used to test Hypothesis 5 (H5),
which states that males with higher scores on a scale of femininity will infer lies less
frequently than those with lower scores.
Estimates of internal consistency for the M scale range from a = 0.67 - 0.78. The
F scale internal consistency estimates are better, ranging from a = 0.72 - 0.80. The range
for the M-F scale is the lowest, yielding an internal consistency estimate range from a =
0.53 - 0.62. Helmreich, Spence, and Wilhelm (1981) believe that the low internal
consistency estimate of the latter are most likely due to the gender-mixed content of the
M-F scale.
For the current study, Chronbach's alpha was calculated as a measure of internal
consistency for the scales of the PAQ. The analysis of the M scale led to an alpha
estimate of a = .684. The F scale of the PAQ yielded a higher estimate of internal
consistency for the current sample, a = .744. Finally, the A scale also yielded a internal
consistency estimate of, a = .402. These results are comparable to those obtained by
Helmreich et al. (1981).
An independent samples /-test was used to evaluate any potential differences
between students and mental health professionals on the scales of the PAQ. The analysis
did not reveal any differences between the two groups of participants on the M scale,
/(307) = 1.366, p = .173, or on the F scale, /(307) = .703, p = .482, or the F scale, /(307) =
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-.819,/? = .413. The results suggest that both groups of participants had similar scores on
the scales of the PAQ. Students and mental health professionals were combined analyses
involving the PAQ.
One-sample /-tests were used to test for differences between the participants in
this samples' scores on the scales of the PAQ and another comparative sample,
specifically the group of 612 college students of Ward, Thorn, and Clements (2006). This
comparison sample was chosen because of its size and the inclusion of college students.
It is noteworthy, however, that the current study also included mental health
professionals, each holding one or more graduate degrees. Males in the current study had
significantly higher scores than males in the comparative sample /(102) = 13.463,/? =
.000. Females in the current study also had significantly higher scores on the masculinity
scale than their counterparts in the comparative sample /(205) = 29.831,/? = .000. Results
were similar for the femininity scale. Males femininity scores were significantly higher
than those from Ward, Thorn, and Clements (2006) /(102) = 21.487,/? = .000. Females
femininity were also higher than those of the comparative sample /(205) = 23.849,/? =
.000. Comparison of the current participants to the sample from Ward, Thorn, and
Clements (2006) on the androgyny (M-F) scale of the PAQ yielded similar results.
Males' androgyny scores were significantly higher than those of the comparative sample
/(102) = 18.911,/? = .000. Female's androgyny scores from the current sample were also
significantly higher than the comparison group /(205) 52.878,/? = .000. Means and
standard deviations can be found in Table 2.
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Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations for PAQ Subscale Scores
Current Study (n =309)
Male
Subscale
PAQ masculinity
PAQ femininity
PAQ androgyny

M
29.21
30.43
23.61

Female
SD
M
4.51 28.53
3.71 31.68
3.31 25.65

Ward et al.. 2006 (n =612)
Male

SD
M
3.66 23.23
4.04 22.58
3.29 17.52

Female
SD
M
4.35 20.90
4.17 24.97
3.58 13.48

SD
4.60
3.77
4.41

Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability
Scale Short Form C
Participants also completed the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale Short
Form C (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) (see Appendix E). Using self-report items, this
instrument measures the tendency to provide socially desirable responses. The authors
designed this instrument such that high scores do not imply pathology of any kind.
The abbreviated form used in this study, consisting of 13 true or false questions,
was extracted from the original 33-item scale. The measure includes eight items
describing positive behaviors that are infrequent in the general population, making the
socially desirable response true. The remaining five items describe negative behaviors
that are likely true in the general population, thus the socially desirable response is false.
Short Form C has an internal consistency of 0.76, while correlating highly (r =
0.93) with the full version of the inventory (Reynolds, 1982). Internal consistency
estimates for the shortened questionnaire range from 0.62 to 0.96 (Ballard, 1992, Fischer
& Fick, 1993; Loo & Thorpe, 2000; Zook & Sipps, 1985). For the current study,
Chronbach's alpha was again used to determine the internal consistency of the
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Marlowe-Crowne for the sample. A comparable estimate of internal consistency was
found for the sample, a = .72. Because this estimate is within the range established by
previous investigators, the data from the instrument was usable for analyses for this
study.
Investigators have proposed that women are more accommodating in their
interpretation of non-verbal cues (Rosenthal & DePaulo, 1985). It is possible that those
higher in social desirability, especially women, will infer lies less frequently. The scores
from the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale were used to determine if there was
a relationship between social desirability and the frequency of the inference of lies for
exploratory purposes only.
An independent samples /-test was used to uncover any group differences
between student and mental health professional participants on the Marlowe-Crowne.
The results show that the students (M= 4.53) (SD = 3.02) and mental health
professionals (M = 4.17) (SD = 3.46) did not significantly differ in social desirability, t
(307) = .935,/? = .350. Because scores were similar, on the Marlowe-Crowne and the
PAQ, students and mental health professionals were combined for the analyses.
A one-sample t-test was used to compare the scores on the Marlowe-Crowne for
participants in the current study to those of a comparative sample. The sample used for
comparison consisted of 429 university students (Zook & Sipps, 1985). This sample was
chosen because of the comparable size and the inclusion of university students. Males'
scores on the Marlow-Crowne were not significantly different than those of the
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comparative sample /(102) = .296, p = .768. Similarly, females social desirability scores
were not significantly different than those of the participants from Zook and Sipps (1985)
/(205) = .925, p =.356. Means and standard deviations can be found in Table 3.

Table 3
Means and Standard Deviations for Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale
Male
Study
Zook & Sipps, 1985 (n =429)
Current Study (n = 309)

M
4.02
4.11

Female
SD
2.81
3.30

M
4.19
4.40

SD
2.97
3.30

Stimulus Questionnaire
A stimulus questionnaire featuring the 24 questions that were asked during the
interview is reproduced in Appendix A. Questions were asked in the same order they
appear in the questionnaire. Space was provided for participants to indicate if they
believed each answer to be the truth or a lie. Participants were also instructed to rate their
confidence in each response on a 5-point Likert type scale ranging from 1 (not confident)
to 5 (highly confident).

Procedure
As noted previously, participants were randomly assigned to one of four
conditions. Participants gave informed consent before testing. They were then asked to
complete a survey of demographic information (see Appendix C) that assessed
participants' age, gender, race, major, relationship/marital status, and socioeconomic
status for student participants. The demographic questionnaire was slightly altered for the
mental health professionals. They indicated their age, gender, race, and occupational

specialty. Also included in this packet was, first, the PAQ (Spence & Helmriech, 1978),
followed by the Marlowe Crowne Social Desirability Scale Short Form C (Crowne &
Marlowe, 1960). Each group was then given a brief introduction explaining that the
interview took place for the purposes of intern selection, and that each interviewee was
an applicant for a competitive internship program in psychology. This explanation was
kept constant across experimental conditions. In each condition, questions and answers
were presented in the same order to keep question order from being a possible confound.
The presentations were approximately 15 minutes in duration to minimize the effects of
fatigue.

Condition A
Participants in condition A (audio-visual target condition) were instructed to
imagine that they were assistants to the interviewer who were to help assess the
truthfulness of answers, and that they should do their best to determine if the interviewee
told the truth or lied in response to each question. Finally, participants were asked to
indicate their confidence in their judgment of the veracity of each answer on the stimulus
questionnaire (see Appendix A). They were told that some of the answers were lies. They
then watched the audio-visual recording from camera one while completing the stimulus
questionnaire. Participants in this condition watched four videos with the following
gender dyad orientations: 1) male interviewee - male interviewer, 2) male interviewee female interviewer, 3) female interviewee - male interviewer, 4) female interviewee female interviewer. The order was randomized to control for order effects in this and
other conditions. Recall that each sender lied to the same predetermined questions.
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Condition B
Participants in condition B (audio-visual third-person observer condition) were
instructed to evaluate the answers of the people being interviewed. Specifically, they
were told that they should do their best to determine if the interviewee was telling the
truth or lying in response to each question. Participants in this group also provided
confidence ratings for each answer. They were told to imagine that their judgments would
be used to corroborate the ratings of the interviewer in order to aid the selection process.
They then watched the recordings made by camera two while completing the stimulus
questionnaire. Recordings for condition B were made simultaneously with those from
condition A, but from a different angle (see Appendix D). Camera two was positioned so
that the interviewee and the interviewer were both visible in the frame. Audio was
recorded from one source, and, thus, was identical to the audio used in condition A. This
prevented any differences in the audio from providing cues to deception or otherwise
confounding comparison with the other conditions that provided audio. Participants in
this condition watched the same four videos with the following gender dyad orientations:
1) male interviewee - male interviewer, 2) male interviewee - female interviewer, 3)
female interviewee - male interviewer, 4) female interviewee - female interviewer. As in
the previous condition, the interviewee lied to the same predetermined questions.

Condition C
Participants in condition C (audio only condition) were instructed to listen to the
audio of the interviews and do their best to determine if the person being interviewed was
telling the truth or lying in response to each question. Again, participants provided
confidence ratings for each answer. They were asked to imagine that their decisions
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would be used to corroborate those of the interviewer to aid in the selection process. They
then heard the four audio recordings, without being exposed to the visual portion of the
stimulus. The stimulus questionnaire was completed as they listened to the audio
recording. As with the conditions A and B, participants in this condition heard audio with
the following gender dyad orientations: 1) male interviewee - male interviewer, 2) male
interviewee - female interviewer, 3) female interviewee - male interviewer, 4) female
interviewee - female interviewer.

Condition D
These participants (transcript only condition) were provided a verbatim written
transcript of the four interviews. They were instructed to read the transcripts of the four
interviews and do their best to determine if the interviewee was telling the truth or lying
in response to each question. As in the other conditions, these participants provided
confidence ratings for each inference. They were also asked to imagine that their
decisions would be used to corroborate those of the interviewer to aid in the selection
process. Participants were presented with a transcript of the audio from Condition C with
the following gender dyad orientations: 1) male interviewee - male interviewer, 2) male
interviewee - female interviewer, 3) female interviewee - male interviewer, 4) female
interviewee - female interviewer. Stereotypical masculine and feminine names were used
in the transcript to allow participants to identify easily the gender of the interviewer and
interviewee. Participants completed the questionnaire as they read the transcript.

CHAPTER THREE

RESULTS

Overview of Analyses
The experimental design of the present study was a mixed methods design. A
between-subjects independent variable was the condition of the stimulus to which
participants were exposed. This variable had four levels varying in the amount of
information contained in the stimulus, (a) The third-person observer audio-visual
condition (3rd person observer) contained the most information. Participants were
exposed to the audio and visual recordings of both members of the interviewerinterviewee dyad, (b) The target audio visual-condition (target) included the audio data
from the interviewer and the audio and visual data from the interviewee, (c) The audioonly condition included only the audio information from both interviewer and
interviewee, (d) Finally, the transcript only condition only included a written transcript of
the audio data, thus excluding non-verbal behaviors completely. The gender of the
participant was also a between-subjects independent variable. Within-subjects
independent variables included the genders of the target and of the interviewerinterviewee dyads. Scores on the three scales of the PAQ and scores on the MarloweCrowne Social Desirability Short Form - C were used as independent variables in
correlational analyses. The dependent variables were the number of lies inferred and the
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confidence in inferences of lies or truth. None of the hypotheses addressed the
participants' confidence in their inferences of lies. These data were analyzed for
exploratory purposes only.
Analyses of these data required several statistical procedures. Hypotheses 1 and 2
involved repeated measures ANOVAs. A one-way ANOVA was used to test hypothesis
3. Pearson's correlations were also used to test for relationships required by hypotheses 4
and 5. Finally, another repeated measures ANOVA was used to assess Hypothesis 6.
One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to analyze participants' confidence
ratings for each question. In the event of a significant main effect involving stimulus
condition when the number of lies inferred or confidence ratings were the dependent
variables, the Student Neumann Keul's post-hoc analysis was used to identify the groups
that were significantly different.

Hypothesis 1
It was proposed that participants in the target condition would infer lies more
frequently when the potential liar was of the opposite sex of the participant than when the
potential liar and the participant were the same sex. A Repeated Measures Analysis of
Variance (ANOVA) was used to test this hypothesis using SPSS® software. The betweensubjects independent variable was the gender of the participant. The within-subjects
independent variable was the gender of the interviewee. The dependent variable was the
number of lie inferences made by the participants. Because this hypothesis was meant to
assess how potential targets would infer lies, only the participants in the target condition
(n = 59) were included in this analysis. The target condition was the closest
approximation of participants being in the position of a target of a lie. Mauchly's Test of
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Sphericity was used to test the equivalence of variance patterns in the data. This test was
not significant, W= 1, X2 = .000, p > .05. This result suggests that the data have
approximately equal variances and that using an uncorrected Repeated Measures
ANOVA is appropriate for this analysis. A main effect was discovered for the gender of
the sender F(\, 57) = 6.298,p = .015, partial t] - .100. This finding suggests that lies were
inferred more frequently in the target condition when senders were female (M = 12.220)
(SD = 5.795) than when they were male (M = 10.848) (SD = 4.909). In order to support
Hypothesis 1, the analysis should have revealed a significant interaction between the
gender of the interviewee/sender and that of the participant. No interaction effects were
observed between the gender of the liar and the gender of the participant, F(1,57) =
1.167, p — .285, partial r| = .020. Thus, the data do not support Hypothesis 1. Relevant
summary statistics can be found in Table 5. Analysis results can be found in Table 4.
These results suggest that the manipulation of the gender of the liar and the gender of the
participant do not significantly affect the number of lies inferred by participants who had
visual exposure to only the potential liar.

Table 4
Means and Standard Deviations of Number of Inferred Lies in the Target Condition
Gender of participant
Male (n=21)
Gender of Liar
Male
Female

M
10.926
12.741

SD
4.843
5.913

Female (n=32)
M
10.781
11.781

SD
5.040
5.746

total (n=59)
M
10.848
12.220

SD
4.909
5.795
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Table 5
Analysis of Variance for Number of Lies Inferred by Each Group
Source

df

F
r|
Between subjects
Gender of Liar
1
6.298
.100
Liar gender x participant gender
1
1.167
.009
Within-group error
57
(9.211)
Within subjects
Participant gender
1
.181
.003
Within-group error
57
(49.209)
Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors.

p
.015*
.471

.672

*= p < .05

Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 states that participants in conditions with equal exposure to the
potential liar and the target would infer lies more often when they were the opposite sex
of the potential liar than when participants and potential liars were the same sex. A
repeated measures ANOVA was used to test this hypothesis. The between-subjects
independent variables were the gender of the participant and the condition of the
stimulus. The within subjects independent variable was the gender of the interviewee.
Given the hypothesis, participants' data in the third-person evaluator group, the audioonly group, and the transcript-only group were used for this analysis. This hypothesis
concerns how participants would infer lies as observers rather than as targets. In the thirdperson observer, audio, and transcript conditions, participants were exposed to the same
amount of information from both the interviewers and the interviewees in the stimuli. For
example, in the third-person evaluator group, participants were exposed to audio/visual
recordings of both confederates in each dyad. The participants had audio/visual data from
the interviewee and audio only for the interviewer in the target condition.
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A total of 250 participants was included. The dependent variable was the number
of lie inferences made by the participants. Mauchly's Test of Sphericity was used to
ensure that variances within the data were approximately equivalent. The test result was
not significant, W = 1.00, X = .000, p > .05. This indicates that no corrections are
necessary to the results of the Repeated Measures ANOVA. The gender of the
interviewee did not produce a main effect, F( 1, 244) = .394, /? = .531, partial r|2 = .002
(see tables 6 and 7). The results show that participants in the three conditions were not
more likely to infer lies due to the gender of the liar. No significant interaction was found
between the independent variables, gender of the liar and gender of the participant, F( 1,
•j

244) = 1.907, p = .169, partial r| = .008 (see Table 6 for relevant summary statistics and
Table 7 for analysis results). No interaction was found between the gender of the liar and
-y

the group, F(2,244) = .695, p = .500 partial r\ = .006. The means and standard deviations
for lie inferences in each condition included in this analysis appear in Table 6. The
interaction effects between gender of the interviewee and the gender of the participant
were crucial for the support of hypothesis. No significant interaction was found. Thus, the
data do not support Hypothesis 2.
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Table 6
Means and Standard Deviations for Inferred Lies in All Conditions Except "Target"
Gender of participant
m a l e (n = 76) f e m a l e (n = 174)
Gender of liar/condition
Male
3rd Person
Audio Only
Transcript Only
Total
Female
3 rd Person
Audio Only
Transcript Only
Total

total (n = 250)

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

12.167
13.870
13.057
13.092

5.305
5.379
5.450
5.360

15.566
13.298
14.188
14.316

7.042
6.026
7.042
8.761

14.704 11.092
13.462
5.820
13.788
6.517
13.944
7.893

12.222
13.826
14.286
13.658

6.103
6.213
7.213
6.636

13.377
12.474
13.891
13.270

6.543
6.077
6.759
6.467

13.085
12.863
14.030
13.388

6.411
6.108
6.889
6.508

Table 7
Analysis of Variance for Inferred Lies in All Conditions Except "Target"

Source
Gender of Liar
Liar gender x participant gender
Liar gender x group
Liar gender x participant gender x group
Within-group error

Between subjects
df
F
.394
1
1.907
1
.695
2
.132
2
(30.221)
244

Within subjects
Participant gender
1
.420
2
.174
Group
Participant gender x group
2
1.035
244
(75.050)
Within-group error
Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors.

.002
.008
.006
.001

P
.531
.165
.500
.877

.002
.001
.008

.517
.840
.357

67

Hypothesis 3
It was hypothesized that male participants would infer lies more often than female
participants in all conditions except in the transcript condition, where non-verbal cues
were unavailable. A multivariate ANOVA was used to compare the mean number of lies
inferred by male and female participants. See Table 8 for relevant means and standard
deviations. There was no significant main effect for stimulus condition F(3, 301) = .347,
p = .772, partial r\ = .004. This result shows that participants in all groups inferred lies
with approximately the same frequency. Neither was a significant main effect found for
the gender of the participant, F(l, 301) = .023, p = .881, partial rj2 = .000. This suggests
that participant gender did not significantly influence the frequency of inferred lies. No
interaction was found between participant gender and group, F(3, 301) = 1.223,/? = .301,
partial r\ = .012 (See Table 9 for relevant analysis results). This suggests that, regardless
of group, participants of both genders inferred approximately the same number of lies.
The results do not support hypothesis 3.

Table 8
Means and Standard Deviations for Number of Inferred Lies by Gender per Condition
Gender of participant
Male

Female

Condition

N

Audio Only

23 28.652

"Target"

27 26.963 17.279

32

3rd

18 24.222

9.873

53 28.736

14.587

27.086

10.815

64 27.922

12.483

103 26.903

12.913

206 27.835

12.573

Person Video

Transcript Only
Grand Mean

35

M

SD
12.452

N

M

SD

57 25.597 11.263
23.719 11.082
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Table 9
Analysis of Variance for Number of Inferred Lies by Gender per Condition
Source

df

F

r\

p

Between subjects
Condition

3

.374

.004

.772

Participant gender

1

.023

.000

.881

Condition x participant gender

3

1.223

.012

.301

Error

301

(161.293)

Hypothesis 4
It was proposed that a negative relationship would be found between female
participants' femininity scores and the number of lies inferred. A Pearson correlation was
used to test this hypothesis. Female participants' (N = 206) total number of inferred lies
was correlated with their scores on the PAQ femininity scale. Scores from participants in
all conditions were included in this analysis. Means and standard deviations for PAQ
subscale scores are found in Table 10 by gender. There was no significant relationship
found between femininity scores and the frequency of inferred lies, r(204) = -.046, p =
.510. These results do not support hypothesis 4.

Table 10
Means and Standard Deviations for PAQ Subscale Scores

Subscale
PAQ masculinity
PAQ femininity
PAQ androgyny

Gender of Participant
Male
Female
M
SD
SD
M
28.69
3.86
28.63
4.09
30.51
3.68
6.20
32.31
23.61
25.89
3.29
4.29

Total
M
28.65
31.70
25.12

SD
4.01
5.54
4.12
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Pearson correlations were also used to determine if any relationship exists
between females' scores on the other scales of the PAQ. No significant relationship was
found between females' scores on the PAQ masculinity scale, r{204) = .004,/? = .958, or
the PAQ androgyny scale r(307) = -.008, p = .905.

Hypothesis 5
It was predicted that a negative correlation would be observed between male
participants' femininity score and the total number of lies inferred. The hope was to
determine if a feminine style of attribution in males was related to less frequent
inferences of lies. To test this male participants' total number of lie inferences was
associated with their scores on the femininity subscale of the PAQ using a Pearson
correlation. Results did not reveal a significant relationship between femininity scores on
the PAQ and the frequency of inference of lies, r(102) - -.032, p = .738. Thus, femininity
scores of males were not related to the number of lies inferred by the participants.
Hypothesis 5 was not supported.
Pearson correlations were also used to explore the data for relationships between
the frequencies of lie inferences and other PAQ scale scores for males. No significant
relationship was found between males' scores on the PAQ masculinity scales and total
number of lie inferences, r(101) = -.002, p = .987, or on the PAQ androgyny scale, r(101)
= -.086, p — .386.

Hypothesis 6
Hypothesis 6 stated that lies would be inferred less often when liars were female.
This hypothesis was tested using repeated-measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA).
The within-subjects factor was the gender of the liar. The between subjects factor was the
condition of the stimulus to which each participant was exposed (Audio, Target, ThirdPerson, Transcript). The dependent variable was the total number of lie inferences. All
309 participants were included in this analysis. Relevant descriptive statistics are
presented in Table 11.

Table 11
Means and Standard Deviations for Number of Inferred Lies per Group
Gender of Liar
Male
Condition
Audio
Target
Third Person
Transcript
Grand Mean

M
13.463
10.847
14.704
14.188
13.353

SD
5.820
4.901
11.092
7.042
8.383

Female
M
12.863
12.220
12.084
14.030
13.165

SD
6.108
5.793
6.411
6.889
6.385

Mauchly's Test of Sphericity was again used to ensure that variances within the
data were approximately equivalent. The test result was not significant, W = 1.00, X =
.000, p > .01. This result indicates that no corrections are needed to the results of the
Repeated Measures ANOVA. The analysis did not reveal a significant main effect for the
gender of the liar F(l, 301) = .043, p = .836, partial

.000. No interaction was found
'j

between the gender of the participant, F( 1, 301) = 2.12, p - .138, partial tj = .007, or
between gender of the liar and condition, F(3, 301) = 1.293,p = 211, partial rj2= .013.
Neither was an interaction found between the gender of the liar, gender of the participant,
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and condition, F(3, 301) = .133,/? = .940, partial tj2= .001. These results suggest that
none of the variables in question or combinations thereof influence the frequency of lie
inferences. Hypothesis 6 is not supported because no significant main effect was found
for the gender of the liar. A summary of results is presented in Table 12.

Table 12
Analysis of Variance for Number of Lies Inferred by Participants of Each Gender/Group
Source

df

F

x\

p

Between subjects
Gender of liar

1

.043

.000

.836

Gender of liar x participant gender

1

2.212

.007

.138

Gender of liar x condition

3

1.293

.013

.277

Gender of liar x participant gender x condition

3

.133

.001

.940

Within-group error

301

(26.242)
Within subjects

Participant gender

1

.147

.000

.702

Condition

3

1.885

.018

.132

Within-group error

301

(70.157)

Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors.
*=p < .05

Exploratory Analyses
For exploratory purposes, recall that all participants completed the MarloweCrowne Social Desirability Scale. Though none of the hypotheses addressed social
desirability, these data are now analyzed. The first goal was to determine if male and
female participants' social desirability scores were significantly different using an
independent samples Mest. The independent variable for this analysis was the gender of
the participant. The dependent variable was the score on the Marlowe-Crowne. There
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were no significant differences between male and female participants' scores on the
Marlowe-Crowne, /(307)= . 177, p = .859. Another goal was to determine if any
significant relationships exist between the number of inferred lies and social desirability.
This analysis did not reveal a significant Pearson correlation between social desirability
and total inferences of lies for all participants, r(307) = -.016,p = .773. Similarly, males'
scores on the Marlowe-Crowne were not related to the number of lie inferences, r(101) =
-.023, p = .820. The same was found for females' scores, r(204) = -.130,/? = .851. These
results suggest that social desirability is not related to the inference of lies for either
gender.
As participants completed the stimulus questionnaire, they indicated their
confidence in each inference of truth or lie. Ratings were provided on a 5-point Likerttype scale ranging from 1, not confident, to 5, highly confident. To explore these data,
confidence ratings for each question were analyzed for all 96 ratings (24 questions x 4
within-subject conditions). Using one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), the
condition of the stimulus to which each participant was exposed was used as the
independent variable. Confidence ratings for each question were used as the dependent
variable; there was at total of 96 ANOVAs. Due to the large number of analyses, a
Bonferonni correction was used to reduce the risk of committing a type one error. Only
three significant models were found when using this correction. They are listed in Table
13. Without the correction, a pattern of higher confidence ratings was noticeable.
Because this analysis is exploratory, the uncorrected results are also included. Significant
models indicated that the stimulus condition significantly influenced confidence ratings
overall (see Tables 14-17). Those means that are significantly different are also reported.
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Table 13
Questions with Significantly Different Means (Bonferonni Correction)

3rd Person
Ql/male (t)
female(s)
Q4/male (t)
male(s)
Q13/male (t)
male(s)
Mean #

Stimulus Condition
Target
Audio

Transcript

3.93 .930 3.29 .812 3.60 1.061 3.95 .962

1-2, 2-4

3.79 .958 4.34 .958 3.53

.993 3.87 .888

2-3

4.07 .884 4.39 .983 3.65 1.145 3.99 .909

2-3

Table 14
Questions with Significantly Different Means (Male Target-Female Sender)

Questions

Stimulus Condition
Target
Audio

M

M

SD

SD

M

Transcript

SD

M

3.91 .949 3.66 .958 3.51 .967 3.89
4.13 .899 4.46 .837 3.89 1.020 4.38
3.51 1.050 3.61 .929 3.19 1.060 3.63
3.95 .962 3.29 .892 3.60 1.060 3.93
3.76 .991 3.34 1.080 3.83 1.080 3.82
3.89 1.050 4.27 .980 3.73 1.080 3.85
3.80 .990 4.29 1.000 3.70 1.010 3.80
3.85 .952 4.22 .930 3.86 1.050 3.75

01
Q2
Q5
Q6
Q16
Q18
Q19
Q23
Mean #

3rd Person

1

2

3

4

SD

Means Significantly Different

.803
.724
1.060
.931
1.020
1.010
.965
1.070

1-3,3-4
1-3,3-4
1-3,3-4
1-3,3-4
1-2,2-3,2-4
1-2,2-3,2-4
1-2,2-3,2-4
1-2
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Table 15
Questions with Significantly Different Group Means (Female Target-Male Sender)
Stimulus Condition
Target
Audio
M
SD M
SD

Questions

3rd Person
M
SD

Ql
Q6

4.11 .856 4.53 .796 3.98 1.010 4.11
3.82 .952 3.41 1.100 3.49 1.020 3.89

.854
.903

Q7

4.12 .884 4.47

.817 3.95 1.070 4.23

.796

Ql 1
Q17
Q19
Mean #

3.62 .923 3.15 1.130 3.51 1.020 3.68 1.030
4.04 .957 4.37 .981 3.79 1.100 4.04 .818
3.91 .905 4.25 .993 3.81 .982 3.85 .995

Transcript
M
SD

Means Significantly Different
1-2, 2-3, 2-4
1-2, 1-3,
2-4, 3-4
1-3, 1-4,
2-3, 2-4
1-2, 2-3,2-4
1-3,2-3
1-2, 2-3,2-4

Table 16
Questions with Significantly Different Means (Female Target-Female Sender)
Stimulus Condition
3rd Person Target
Questions

M

SD

Ql
Q2
Q4
Q9
Q10
Q13
Q19
M e a n#

3.80 892
3.63 1.020
3.87 .888
3.77 .946
3.74 1.020
3.99 .909
3.72 .959
1

Audio

Transcript

M

SD

M

SD

3.61
4.17
4.34
4.29
3.93
4.39
4.22

1.450
1.090
.958
1.000
1.080
.983
1.040

3.61
3.44
3.53
3.90
3.46
3.55
3.74

1.060
1.130
.993
1.030
1.040
1.140
1.000

2

3

M
4.13
3.63
3.79
3.99
3.96
4.07
3.73
4

SD
.860
.975
.827
.837
.818
.884
.985

Means Significantly Different
1-2, 1-3, 1-4
1-2, 2-3,2-4
1-2, 2-3, 2-4
1-3, 1-4, 2-4
1-3, 2-3
1-2, 1-3,2-3,2-4,3-4
1-2, 2-3, 2-4
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Table 17
Questions with Significantly Different Means (Male Target-Male Sender)

3rd

Stimulus Condition
Person Target
Audio
Transcript

M
SD
M SD M
Q19
3.60 1.12 4.12 1.00 3.70
Q21
3.68 1.05 3.63 1.03 3.33
Q24
3.73 1.01 4.17 1.05 3.73
Mean# 1
2
3
Questions

SD M
SD
1.13 3.79 1.080
1.11 3.79 .954
1.02 3.93 1.020
4

Means Significantly Different
2-4
1-3
2-3, 2-4

A total of 63 significant differences were found between conditions on confidence
ratings for individual questions on the stimulus questionnaire. The results suggest that
participants in the audio-visual conditions (3rd person evaluator and target conditions)
were more confident that participants in the audio-only and transcript-only conditions. Of
the significant differences, participants in the third-person evaluator group and the target
group gave significantly higher confidence ratings 49 times (77.8%). Higher ratings were
more common for the target group, which yielded 33 (52.3%) significantly higher ratings.
Interestingly, nine (14%) means had significantly higher confidence ratings for
participants in the target group than those in the third-person evaluator group. Only four
(6%) of the differences were due to higher ratings by participants in the third-person
evaluator group than those in the target group. Another result of interest was that 12
(19%) of the differences involved higher ratings by participants in the transcript-only
group than other groups. Most notably, six questions (9.5%) were rated higher by
participants in the transcript-only condition than those in the audio-only condition. None
of the questions in the audio-only condition had significantly higher confidence ratings
than those in the transcript-only condition.
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Overall, among the significantly different mean confidence ratings, participants in
the audio/visual conditions usually had higher confidence than those in the other two
conditions (Audio-Only, Transcript-Only). There were 28 total significant differences
found between the audio-visual conditions and "non audio-visual" conditions. Of these,
participants' confidence ratings were higher for 22 (78.6%) questions in audio-visual
conditions compared to higher ratings for six (21.4%) questions in the non audio-visual
conditions. This pattern suggests that participants were more confident when they had
access to more information. This pattern was not found among questions in transcript and
audio-only conditions. In fact, there were six differences between the two non audio
visual conditions. In all six cases, participants were more confident in their inferences for
the question in the transcript condition. These findings suggest that participants were
most confident when they were able to use both audio and visual data. However, when
the visual data was not available, participants were more confident in the transcript
condition.

CHAPTER FOUR

DISCUSSION
A preponderance of the existing research on deception is concerned with factors
that influence one's ability to accurately detect lies (DePaulo et al., 2003). However, the
evidence clearly indicates that human beings have approximately chance-level lie
detection accuracy (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Ekman, 2001). Accepting this, the focus of
the present research was on the possibly biasing role that gender can play on the
inferences of lies in others. Below, the major findings are interpreted according to
hypothesis.
To summarize, DePaulo et al. (1985), DePaulo et al. (2003), and Rosenthal and
DePaulo (1979) have speculated about how factors such as gender influence lie detection.
The goal of the present research was to how gender influences how inferences of lies are
formed. This study, unfortunately, provides little evidence to support a gender bias or
"opposite sex bias". Moreover, the results do not show that a feminine style of
accommodation influences how often lies are inferred. There were no identifiable
differences between male and female participants on any of the analyses, regardless of
the condition of the stimulus to which they were exposed. Consequently, it seems that the
manipulation of the amount of information presented to participants had little or no
impact on how often they inferred lies.
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The only significant finding a result that was not hypothesized. It was found that,
as targets, participants inferred more lies in females than in males. This is
counterintuitive when considering the evidence that women commonly receive higher
ratings of trustworthiness and credibility than men (Boccaccini & Brodsky, 2002; Dacy
& Brodsky, 1992; Porter et al., 2008).

Hypothesis 1
The research of DePaulo et al. (1985) suggests that when dyads consist of
opposite sex individuals, the target is more accurate in detecting lies. However, these
authors did not evaluate how often participants inferred lies. Rather than evaluating the
accuracy of lie detection, this study was designed to test for a possible gender bias that
influences the frequency with which lies are inferred in a study in which male and female
senders lied equally often (50% of the time). Because of the nature of the stimulus
materials, it was impossible to have each participant have the experience of actually
being the target of a potential lie. To address this, a condition was created in which
participants watched an audio/visual stimulus that showed only the person being
interviewed. Of course, participants were still exposed to the interviewer via the audio
content. In the present research no evidence was found of the predicted interaction
between the gender of the sender and the gender of the target. Participants in the current
study inferred lies with approximately the same frequency, both when senders and
participants were the same sex and when senders and participants were of the opposite
sex. The gender of the potential liar alone also did not significantly influence the
frequency of inferred lies.

The study by DePaulo et al. (1985) addressed the ability of targets to detect lies
when the potential liar was the opposite sex. Hypothesis 1 essentially proposed that
participants would be more likely to infer lies when senders were the opposite sex. It is
possible that lie detectors in DePaulo et al. (1985) actually inferred lies more frequently
in members of the opposite sex, thereby, increasing their accuracy in detecting lies. For
this study, the participants in the target condition were not significantly biased by the fact
that the potential liar was of the opposite sex. Targets in this study apparently did not
expect to be lied to more frequently when the sender is of the opposite sex. If targets did
expect lies more often, it is logical that they would infer lies more frequently.
Interestingly, as targets, participants were more likely to infer lies when senders
were female. This is curious considering the evidence that females are frequently given
higher ratings of credibility than men (Dacy & Brodsky, 1992). It is possible that, due to
ongoing societal changes, women are losing the credibility that they once enjoyed. It is
also possible that other characteristics of the female senders influenced the inference of
lies. They were not pre-matched for trustworthiness or credibility, an oversight that
should be corrected in future research.

Hypothesis 2
DePaulo et al. (1985) suggested that, when targets and senders are of the opposite
sex, targets are more accurate lie detectors and would thus likely infer lies more often.
The present test of Hypothesis 2 differed from that of hypothesis 1 in that data from the
other three conditions (3rd Person Evaluator, Audio-Only, Transcript-Only) were used.
Participants in these conditions had equal exposure to both the sender and the actual
target of the lie. Under these conditions, it was proposed that participants would infer
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more lies when they and the potential liar were opposite in sex than when they were the
same sex. To review the three included stimulus conditions in greater detail, the
conditions included the third-person evaluator condition in which participants watched
the audio/visual recording of the stimulus interviews, the audio-only condition, in which
participants heard only the audio from the stimulus interviews, and the transcript-only
condition, in which participants were given a written transcript of the stimulus interviews.
The data analysis yielded a similar result as the first hypothesis. Even when participants
had equal access to both the potential target of a lie and the sender of a potential lie, there
was no interaction of the gender of the liar and the gender of the participant. Participants
inferred lies with approximately the same frequency when senders were the same sex as
when they were the opposite sex of the participant.
Interestingly, no main effect was identified for the gender of the sender. Only in
the target condition was it found that lies were inferred more often in females. These
findings suggest that the participants behaved differently as targets than in other
conditions. Because this effect was not found in the other three conditions, it may be that
the participants felt that female senders lied to them more often than they lied to the
interviewer in the other conditions because of their roles as targets. Of course, it is
possible that these results were swayed due to other factors. For example, in the
conditions in which participants had equal exposure to the sender and the interviewer,
characteristics of the interviewer may have influenced lie inferences. It may have been
that the mere "presence" of the interviewer reduced the "burden" on the participants to
identify lies. Clearly more research is needed to understand fully how gender interacts
with the role of the observer to influence the inference of lies.
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Hypothesis 3
DePaulo et al. (1985), DePaulo et al. (2003), and Rosenthal and DePaulo (1979)
proposed that women are more accommodating of non-verbal behaviors, especially those
that are more common during lying. In this study, it was hypothesized that women would
infer lies less frequently than men, due to being more accommodating of non-verbal cues
during ambiguous cases in which lying may have occurred. Sadly, no significant gender
differences were found between the mean numbers of lie inferences across conditions.
That is to say, across all stimulus conditions, male and female participants inferred lies
with approximately the same frequency. Furthermore, when the total number of lies was
summed across all of the conditions in which participants had access to non-verbal
information (target, third-person observer, audio-only), no significant difference was
found between the mean number of lies inferred by female participants and male
participants. In the transcript condition as with the other conditions, there was no
evidence that women inferred lies significantly less than men.
Participants in this study were exposed to stimulus materials varying in the
amount of information participants had access to in liar-target interactions. DePaulo et al.
(1985) found that women were generally more accurate in interpreting non-verbal cues.
However, women's non-verbal detection skills decreased when cues came from non
verbal channels that were more difficult to control and were shorter in duration, as cues
might be during lying. The researchers speculated that women learned to accommodate
non-verbal cues to lying. The goal of Hypothesis 3 was to test whether this
"accommodating" style extends to inferences of lies. Essentially, the present results
showed that women made the same number of negative attributions (lie inferences) as
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men. However, it was not possible to determine if participants were using non-verbal
behaviors as a basis of gender bias for making lie inferences. The procedures of this study
are different from those that have been used to investigate female accommodation
(DePaulo et al., 1985; DePaulo et al., 2003; Rosenthal & DePaulo, 1979). The current
study was not designed to evaluate how participants interpreted non-verbal cues, or any
other common cue to lying. Therefore, these findings do not contradict the findings of
previous studies because the basis for lie inferences was not assessed. The broad aim was
to identify the influence of gender on the inference of lies, regardless of the behavioral
basis or the accuracy of the inferences. Rather than casting doubt on previous findings,
the current study provide possible insight into what similar studies would find were they
conducted more at present. Since the studies by DePaulo and colleagues of the late 1970s
and 1980s, females may be less accommodating of nonverbal behaviors as their roles in
society have expanded.

Hypothesis 4
DePaulo et al. (1985) and Rosenthal and DePaulo (1979) have suggested that
women learn an accommodating style of non-verbal cue interpretation through normal
processes of socialization. This implies that a feminine style of attribution could help
account for variation in the inferences of lies. To test this, participants in this study
completed the Personality Attributes Questionnaire (Helmreich, Spence, & Wilhelm,
1981), which assessed the degree to which participants applied stereotypically masculine
and/or feminine descriptors to themselves. If being "more accommodating" of non-verbal
cues is typical of being more feminine, then higher scores on the femininity scale of the
PAQ should have correlated with the number of lies inferred. The number of lies inferred
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by females was not significantly correlated with femininity or other scales of the PAQ.
This suggests that, even if the accommodation of non-verbal cues to lying is a socialized
component of femininity, it may be very subtle such that it does not impact the frequency
of lie inferences. These findings seem to contradict the implication of DePaulo et al.
(1985) and Rosenthal and DePaulo (1979) that women are socialized to give others the
benefit of a doubt in their interpretations of ambiguous non-verbal behaviors. On the
other hand, as noted above, the roles of women may have changed and expanded in
society over the past few decades such that they are less accommodating.

Hypothesis 5
Hypothesis 5 stated that among male participants, there would be a negative
correlation between femininity and the number of lies inferred. As with Hypothesis 4,
this hypothesis was aimed at testing how femininity is correlated with inference of lies,
but in males. As noted above, previous researchers have suggested the females are
socialized to be more accommodating of the cues to lying (DePaulo et al., 1985; DePaulo
et al., 2003; Rosenthal & DePaulo, 1979). In an analogous way, males who endorsed
more traditionally feminine attributes might also have learned to be more accommodating
of the ambiguous cues to deception. If they were more accommodating, they might also
be expected to infer lies less frequently than those with lower femininity scores. Contrary
to Hypothesis 5, there were no significant correlations between femininity or any other
PAQ subscales and the frequency of inferences of lies. It is possible for both males and
females that femininity is not a key factor in the inferences of lies. Perhaps nonverbal
cues such as gaze aversion play a greater role (DePaulo et al., 2003)
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Hypothesis 6
The final hypothesis was a test of a corollary, in a context involving deception, of
Dacy and Brodsky's (1992) findings that women were rated as more trustworthy than
men. It is certainly socially valuable to know if women receive higher trustworthiness
ratings than men generally. Lie inferences are a logical behavioral consequence of such
judgments. It was proposed that lies would be inferred more frequently when senders
were male. This hypothesis was not supported. Participants in this study inferred lies
equally often, regardless of the gender of the potential liar. This finding seems to suggest
that ratings of trustworthiness are not behaviorally manifested in the form of gender
biased lie inferences. However trustworthiness of the sender was not actually measured in
this study. Future research should redress this oversight.

Exploratory Analyses
Participants also completed the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability scale for
exploratory purposes. The instrument measures the degree to which people act in a
socially desirable manner (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960; Zook & Sipps, 1985). Researchers
have proposed that women are socialized to be more accommodating, such as not
inferring lies based on ambiguous non-verbal cues. Rather they learned to give others the
benefit of a doubt (Rosenthal & DePaulo, 1979; DePaulo et al., 1985). Though no studies
have addressed the role of social desirability in the inferences of lies, the previous
findings suggest that such factors might be influential. For the current study, males' and
females' scores on this measure were not significantly different. Moreover, the analyses
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did not reveal significant correlations between scores for either gender on the MarloweCrowne and the frequency of lie inferences. This factor can be disregarded in future
research.
The exploratory analyses involving confidence ratings, when the alpha level was
corrected, showed no pattern of significantly higher confidence ratings for any of the
experimental conditions. However, without this correction, a pattern did emerge. The
analyses revealed that participants were generally more confident in their inferences in
the audio-visual conditions. In these conditions, participants had access to both verbal
and non-verbal cues for detecting deception. The finding that participants in the target
condition gave significantly higher confidence ratings on several questions than
participants in the third-person evaluator condition implies that behaviors of the
interviewer might reduce participants' confidence. Though the results of the ANOVA are
not significant without the correction, it is a logical pattern in the participants' confidence
ratings. The simplest explanation for these results generally is that participants had access
to more information; namely the non-verbal behavior of both the interviewer and the
interviewee. Because they were considering more information, the task became more
difficult and resulted in lower ratings of confidence. Essentially, participants had to
multitask. It is also noteworthy that the instructions given to participants in the target
condition were slightly different that those given to participants in other conditions,
creating a potential confound. Participants in the target condition were asked to imagine
that the interviewee was talking directly to them. These participants alone were
evaluating the veracity of the interviewee's answers. In other conditions, participants
were asked to "help the interviewer" determine if the participant was telling the truth. As
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to the practical importance of confidence ratings for lie detection purposes DePaulo et al.
(2003) and Garrido, Masip. and Herrero (2004) found that confidence and accuracy are
not related.
It is logical that more information leads to more confidence, which seems to be
the basis of higher confidence ratings in the target and third-person evaluator conditions.
Interestingly, participants were more confident in the target condition, which is more
representative of typical interpersonal interactions. Of course, these analyses are not
simply indicative of confidence in inferences of lies, but of confidence in inferences of
truth as well. Understanding factors that lead to more confidence can be useful in many
ways. For example, researchers might apply such findings in future studies of credibility
and trustworthiness. This study did not analyze deeply the factors that influenced
confidence ratings. Because of design limitations, future research should also examine
how confidence ratings relate to lie detection accuracy and what other factors influence
ratings

Limitations and Research Suggestions
Several limitations of this research are noteworthy. Participants of this study,
though diverse, are not representative of the general population. For instance,
undergraduate and graduate students, as well as mental health professionals, all of whom
had obtained a graduate degree to obtain licensure, have received more education than
members of the general population. Gender bias may not be as strong among the better
educated. Fischer and Good (1994) and Bavishi, Madera and Hebl, (2010) have
investigated the presence of gender bias in universities and noted that discrimination is
still evident in many forms among students in institutions of higher education, but it is
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often subtle. Obtaining a sample of people with less education and from other
professional backgrounds could provide more evidence of gender bias in the inference of
lies. Such investigation could advance understanding of how professionals in a variety of
fields are vulnerable to gender-biased lie inferences.
It is also possible that the motivation of the present participants to detect lies
influences the frequency of lie inferences. DePaulo et al. (2003) found that poorly
motivated observers detect few lies and poorly motivated senders give up few reliable
cues to deception. DePaulo et al. (1985) showed that as liars are increasingly motivated to
succeed at lying, lie detectors are more successful at detecting their lies. It is reasonable
to assume that altering the motivation of lie detectors to detect lies might also influence
not only their accuracy at lie detection, but also the frequency with which they infer lies.
To test this, future researchers may divide participants into groups with various levels of
incentive for accurate lie detection. For example, one group could receive $10 for
attaining a certain level of accuracy, another group no reward, etc. Anderson and Butzin
(1979) proposed that motivation increases performance (Performance = Motivation x
Ability), a theory that is foundational to industrial/organizational psychology. Based on
this premise, it can be predicted that the higher the motivation of observers, the greater
their attention to cues will be, resulting in greater inferences of lies and hopefully greater
accuracy as well.
In the present study, it was not possible to identify confidence ratings in
inferences of lies separately from those of inferences of truths. It would be interesting and
helpful to understand if confidence in lie inferences are influenced by different factors
than those that influence confidence in truth inferences. However, other studies have
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shown that higher confidence is not associated with accuracy, generally (Garrido et al.,
2004; Masip, Garrido, & Herrero, 2004). Future research should seek to identify the
factors affecting confidence ratings in inferences of lies and truth and how accuracy can
be improved.
Several decades have passed between the time of many of the studies on
credibility that are reviewed here were conducted and the present. It is possible that
society's gender biases have lessened over the years. The sample might also be less
vulnerable to the biases that were being studied. The sample used for this study was
composed of college students and college graduates. Though there is evidence of
prejudice in those who have received higher education, they may be less pronounced than
in the general population (Fischer & Good, 1994).
The present experimental situation may have lacked ecological validity. It is
uncommon for people to be asked to evaluate the veracity of statements presented to
them in a recording or in a transcript. Because participants were asked to do a task
involving an unnatural situation, it is likely that results were thereby influenced. It could
be that participants would behave differently if the situation were more like a "real life"
interaction, or they had even more exposure to potential liars (e.g., if the interview was
taking place in the same room as the participants). It is possible that if the participants
could have had more "contact" with the sender, that biases would have been affected.
Making modifications to increase the "realism" of the situation would certainly provide
results that could be more easily generalized.
In regard to how gender-related attribution style was assessed, it is possible that
the PAQ did not directly measure the factors of femininity that are related to social
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accommodation. The Bern Sex Role Inventory (Bern, 1974) (BSRI), for example, uses a
different method for plotting masculinity and femininity along continuums. However, the
scales of the PAQ and the BSRI provide such similar outcomes that they have been
described as "interchangeable" (Lubinski, Tellegen, & Butcher, 1983). Still, use of the
BSRI in future research might produce results confirmatory of Hypothesis 4 and 5
because the BEM is longer and more comprehensive.

Additional Areas for Future Research
Deception research, as a field of study, has for some time examined human
beings' accuracy at lie detection (DePaulo et al., 2003). At this time, even as many
methods have been proposed, it will be beneficial to the understand of what cues people
use to infer that other people are lying, and how biases might cause judgment errors
(National Research Council, 2003). By identifying biases, researchers can conceivably
teach human lie detectors how to control for them. DePaulo et al. found that misleading
cues such as signs of nervousness and gaze aversion. Less research has focused on how
gender, race, age or other demographics affect disciplines such as law, education,
psychology and politics, to name a few. To the extent that these cues are misleading,
professionals can be taught to overlook them as faulty cues to deception.
It is likely that many biases are associated with the inference that a lie is taking
place. Dacy and Brodsky (1992) and Porter et al. (2008) provide evidence that
attractiveness, attire, professional background, and qualifications; among others influence
judgments of credibility and trustworthiness. Porter et al. showed that trustworthiness
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judgments are made very quickly. Consequently, it is likely that any readily observable
factor about the individual being judged could influence inferences of lies. This is an
exciting area of investigation available to interested researchers.
Personality type of the target or evaluator could be among the factors that impact
the inferences of lies. The Big Five personality measures of the NEO-Personality
Inventory (NEO PI) (Costa & McCrae, 1985) might provide valuable data that leads to a
broader understanding of how lying inferences are formed. The NEO PI measures factors
such as "Neuroticism" of which "vulnerability" is a facet. Individuals with high scores in
vulnerability often feel helpless and emotionally out of control (Weiner & Greene, 2008).
People who feel helpless might be less likely to infer lies. Conversely, they might feel
that others are more likely to be dishonest, and infer lies more frequently. "Extraversion"
is also a potentially important factor in the NEO PI. High scorers in extraversion prefer
social interactions, and are often dominant and assertive in their social groups (Weiner &
Greene). As lie detectors, high scorers may be more attuned to the behaviors of the liars,
as they are more frequently engaged in social interactions. Thus, they might interpret
non-verbal behaviors more accurately to detect lies. As liars, they might be more gifted
by virtue of their frequent social interaction. Agreeableness is perhaps the personality
factor that would be most influential in lie inferences. "Trust" is one component of
agreeableness (Weiner & Greene). Individuals with high scores on this scale believe that
people are generally trustworthy (Weiner & Greene). It is logical to postulate that those
with high scores on trust will be less likely to infer lies. Low scorers tend to be distrustful
of others, and believe that most people have self-serving motivations, even when they
seem altruistic. Therefore, it could be inferred that low scorers would be more likely to
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infer lies (Weiner & Greene). Though the aforementioned scales seem to be the most
likely to influence inferences of lies, other personality dimensions may do so as well.
This area of research is wide open.
An important goal of lying research has been to improve the accuracy of human
lie detection (Bond et al., 1992; DePaulo et al., 2003; DePaulo et al., 1985; Frank &
Ekman, 2004; Rosenthal & DePaulo, 1979; Vrij et al., 2008; Vrij et al., 2009). Although
Garrido et al. (2004) showed that confidence and accuracy are not strongly related, future
research could further investigate factors that influence confidence and accurate lie
detection concurrently. Such information could inform future efforts to train human lie
detectors. To study this, researchers could do a more in-depth investigation into what
information increases confidence in lie inferences. For example, specific behaviors or
physical characteristics of senders or personality factors of senders, targets, and observers
may influence confidence in lie inferences and their accuracy (Bond & DePaulo). By
identifying biases and their impacts, researchers might develop training modules for
police, therapists, and others to make explicit these sources of inaccuracy. Improved
human lie detection would result.
Studying biases using methods such as those in this study are important in several
areas other than lie detection. Credibility researchers could use information to identify
more factors that influence credibility and its components. Psychologists can also use the
information from this study and other such studies to increase their credibility and
manage their biases. Doing so would be beneficial for improving the therapeutic
relationship and maximizing psychologists' efficacy in other areas of practice for
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forensics, training, and supervision. By isolating factors that influence biases and testing
them in the most realistic settings, future research can positively impact many areas of
society.

APPENDIX A
STIMULUS QUESTIONNAIRE
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Stimulus Questionnaire
Each of the individuals responding to these questions is an applicant for a competitive internship in psychology. The following
questions are regarding their education, legal, and personal background. Internship directors and staff use these questions along
with other information provided by the applicant to determine how well the applicant will "fit in" with the staff.
Please indicate if you believe the applicant was telling the truth or lying to each question listed below. Do not leave any blank.
In the space provided to the right of your response, please indicate your confidence in the response you chose on a scale from I
not confident to 5 very confident. Circle the number that best represents your confidence in your response.
Truth
1.
2.

Do you always wear your seatbelt when you drive?

Lie
not confident 1. 2. . .3 . 4 .5 very confident

What year did you receive your GED or
graduate from high school?

not confident 1 .. .2 . 3. . 4 . .5 very confident

3.

Have you ever been convicted of a felony?

not confident 1. 2 .3. . 4 . .5 very confident

4.

In what state were you born?

not confident 1...2...3...4...5 very confident

5.

What was your high school GPA?

not confident 1 ...2...3...4...5 very confident

6.

Do you wear sunscreen when you

not confident 1 ...2...3...4.. .5 very confident

7.

Do you use your cellphone while driving?

are exposed to excessive sunlight?

8.

not confident 1 ...2. . 3...4...5 very confident

Have you ever attempted to forge a check
or tax document?

not confident 1 . ..2. . .3. . .4 . .5 very confident

9.

Have you ever used an illegal drug

not confident 1 ...2...3...4 . .5 very confident

10.

What do you currently do for work?

not confident 1...2. ..3. . .4. ..5 very confident

11.

Have you ever failed to pay back a loan?

not confident 1 ...2...3...4...5 very confident

12

Are you currently being sued?

not confident 1...2...3. .4. . 5 very confident

13.

Have you ever lied in order to get a job?

not confident 1 . . .2. . .3. . .4 . 5 very confident

14.

Do you smoke cigarettes?

not confident 1 ...2...3 . .4...5 very confident

15.

Has anyone ever bribed you?

not confident 1...2...3...4...5 very confident

16.

Have you ever tried to bribe someone?

not confident 1...2...3...4...5 very confident

17.

Have you had any traffic violations in the
last three years?

not confident 1 ...2. .3 . 4 . .5 very confident

18.

Have you ever been fired from a job?

not confident 1 .. .2 . 3. . 4. .. 5 very confident

19

Have you ever abused prescription medication?

not confident 1. ..2...3...4...5 very confident

20

Have you ever cheated to win a game or contest?

not confident 1, 2...3...4...5 very confident

21.

Have you ever lied to your boss?

not confident 1 ...2...3...4. .5 very confident

22.

If we offered, would you be willing to take less
money to do your job for our company?

not confident 1 . . . 2 . . . 3...4...5 very confident

23.

Are you currently employed?

not confident I. ..2. . .3. . .4.. 5 very confident

24.

Do you have any disability recognized by the
university?

not confident 1. . .2. . .3. . .4...5 very confident

APPENDIX B
HUMAN USE COMMITTEE
APPROVAL FORM
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MEMORANDUM

IO:

Mr. Byron Simoneaux and Dr. Jcffcry Walczyk

FROM:

Barbara Talbot, University Research

SUBJHCT:

HUMAN USK COMMITTEE REVIEW

DATE

June 21, 2011

In order to facilitate your project, an EXPEDITED REVIEW has been done for your proposed
study entitled:

"Effects of Gender Composition of Target and Sender Dyads on the
Tendency to Infer Lies and Deception Detection"
IIL'C 867 (Revision)
The proposed study's revised procedures were found to provide reasonable and adequate
safeguards against possible risks involving human subjects. The information to be collected may
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DEMOGRAPHICS FORM
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Gender:
1. Male
2. Female

Major:

Age:

Classification:

Ethnicity:

Marital Status

1. Freshman
2. Sophomore
3. Junior
4. Senior

College GPA:
1.4.0-3.0
2. 2.9-2.0
3. 1.9-1.0
4. 0.9-0.0
5. N/A

1. African American
2. Asian American
3. Caucasian
4. Hispanic
5. Other

Average Annual Income
l.Over $200,000
2. $100,000- $200,000
3. $50,000-$100,000
4. $25,000 - $50,000
5. Below $25,000

1. Divorced
2. Married
3. Single
4. Widowed
5. Other

Enrollment Status
1. Part-time
2. Full Time

APPENDIX D
CAMERA POSITIONS
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APPENDIX E
PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES
QUESTIONNAIRE
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Personal Attributes Questionnaire
The items below inquire about what kind of person you think you are. Euch items consists of a pair of
characteristics, with the letters A-E in between. For example:
Not at all Artistic

A

B

C

D

E

Very Artistic

Each pair describes contradictory characteristics—that is. you cannot be both at the same time, such as very
artistic and not at all artistic.
The letters form a scale between the two extremes. You arc to choose a letter which describes where you fall on
the scale. For example, if you think you have no artistic ability, you would choose A. If you think you are pretty
good, you might choose D. If you arc only medium, you might choose C. and so forth.
A
I.
2

Not at all aggressive
Not at all Independent

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Not at all emotional
Very submissisve
Not at all excitable in a major crisis

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Very passive
Not at all able to devote
self completely to others
Very rough
Not at all helpful to others
Not at all competitive
Very home oriented
Not at all kind

13. Indifferent to others approval
14. Feelings not easily hurt
15. Not at all aware of
feelings of others
16. Can make decisions easily
17. Gives up very easily
18.
19.
20.
21.

22.
23.
24.

Never cries
Not at all self-conlldent
Feels very inferior
Not at all understanding
of others
Very cold in relations with others
Very little time for security
Goes to picces under pressure

B c

D

E

o o o o o
o o o o o
o o o o o

Very aggressive
Very independent

o o o o o
o o o o o
o o o o o

Very dominant
Very excitable in a major crisis
Very active
Able to devote self
completely to others

o

o o o o

o
o
o
o
o

o o o
o o o
o o o
o o o
o o o

o
o
o
o

o
o o o o o
o o o o o
o o o

o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Very emotional

Very
Very
Very
Very
Very

gentle
helpful to others
competitive
worldly
kind

Highly needful of others approval
Feelings easily hurt
Very aware of feelings
of others
Has difficulty making decisions
Never gives up easily
Cries very easily
Very self-confident
Feels superior
Very understanding of
others
Very warm in relations with others
Very strong need for security
Stands up well under pressure

APPENDIX F
MARLOWE-CROWNE SOCIAL DESIRABILITY
SCALE SHORT FORM C
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Read each of the following items and decide whether the statement is true or false as it
pertains to you personally and mark T or F in the blank beside the statement to indicate
this.
1.1 sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my way.
2. On a few occasions, I have given up doing something because I thought
too little of my ability.
3. There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people in
authority even thought I knew they were right.
4. No matter who I'm talking to, I'm always a good listener.
5.1 can remember "playing sick" to get out of something.
6. There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone.
7. I'm always willing to admit it when I make a mistake.
8.1 sometimes try to get even, rather than forgive and forget.
9.1 am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable.
10.1 have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different
from my own.
11. There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortunes
of others.
12.1 am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me.
13.1 have never deliberately said something that hurt someone's feelings.
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